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ABSTRACT
We look at the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on
the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. Re-
source rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger
proportion of natural resources. We argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation af-
fected the quality of state governance of natural resources. We describe a model of collusion between
state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data
between natural resource abundance and post-breakup local outcomes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Does political secession yield economic dividends? Evidence on this question is mixed.1 Secessionist
movements are often motivated by economic incentives; and in several cases these incentives relate
to the ownership of natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2006).2 But some of the effects of political
secession come from its effects on governance, effects that may be shaped by the re-allocation of nat-
ural resources. Indeed, political secession provides a natural test-bed for investigating whether the
widely-documented adverse influence of natural resources on economic performance (the “curse” of
natural resources) flows through a political channel.
In this paper, we exploit the formation of three new Indian states in 2001 to examine how post-
secession outcomes for local economies vary according to the local distribution of mineral deposits.
A key feature of the 2001 Indian secession is that two of the original states contained a significant share
of India’s natural resources, and these were concentrated within specific geographical areas. Figure 1
shows the states that were involved: the states that seceded are Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarak-
hand; the associated rump states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Figure 2 illustrates
the dramatic shift in control of mineral deposits from the original state to the new states. Table 1 gives
a summary of the spatial distribution of natural resource rich (NRR) constituencies pre and post break
up, in Columns 1 and 2. The Bihar-Jharkhand state pair witnessed a large change in the distribution
of natural resources upon breakup, with Jharkhand (the new state) obtaining almost all of the min-
eral deposits relative to Bihar. The breakup of Madhya Pradesh did mean that a substantial part of
its natural resources accrued to the new state of Chhattisgarh, though Madhya Pradesh remains one
of the states that are richer in natural resources. Finally, the Uttar Pradesh-Uttarakhand state pair
saw a high proportion of mineral deposits go to Uttarakhand. The secession episode thus provides a
quasi-natural experimental setting for examining how natural resource endowments are reflected in
economic outcomes through political reorganisation.
Using a combined spatial discontinuity with difference-in-difference design, we examine the dif-
ferential effects of the breakup on economic performance across new (seceding) and old (rump) states
by examining the evolution of economic activity, proxied by luminosity, for 1,124 constituencies in the
three pairs of states, comparing outcomes across the new state borders for 186 assembly constituen-
cies (ACs) that are natural resource rich and for 938 ACs that are not, over the period 1992-2010. This
allows us to study how seceding natural resource rich (NRR) constituencies perform relative to rump
NRR units and how seceding natural resource poor (NRP) constituencies perform relative to rump
NRP units.3 The borders of the assembly constituencies remained the same after secession making
meaningful comparisons possible. Focusing on longitudinal, within-country comparisons allows us
to circumvent some of the problems inherent in cross-country analyses.4
To identify the effect of state breakup on development outcomes, we make use of the geographic
discontinuity at the boundaries of each pre-breakup state. We additionally exploit the time dimension
of our data as a further source of identification. Essentially, we use the observed changes in outcomes
1Rodríguez-Pose and Stermšek (2015), examine successive secession movements in the former Yugoslavia and find no
evidence of an independence premium. Rose (2006), on the other hand, finds no evidence that a larger size is beneficial.
Theoretical analyses of the question (e.g. Boffa et al. 2016) have also pointed to a trade-off in decentralisation between the
gains from policies that are better matched to local preferences and the potential loss of political accountability that can
occur in smaller jurisdictions.
2E.g., the secession of South Sudan, rich in oil, from the rest of Sudan; or the case of Scotland, where the slogan “It’s
Scotland’s Oil” was used to promote the cause of independence. Sablik 2015 offers a useful summary.
3An assembly constituency is a state-level electoral unit which, under India’s first-pass-the post electoral system, elects
one member of the state legislative body.
4Cust and Poelhekke (2015) discuss these advantages and document other related studies on natural resources in a
within-country context.
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Figure 1: Reorganisation of states in 2001
The figure shows the breakup of states in 2001. Areas shaded by dots represent newly created
states; these are the states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand, which broke away from
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh respectively. The map is representative of the political
boundaries in 2001 (Administrative Atlas of India, Census of India, 2011).
Figure 2: Distribution of mineral deposits across the reorganised states
The figure shows the distribution of mineral deposits in India, across the states that were reor-
ganised in 2002. Mineral deposits are indicated by small circles.
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Table 1: Endowment of natural resources and growth across states
Proportion of Mines Average Growth Rate
(Planning Commission)
Pre-breakup Post-breakup Pre-breakup Post-breakup
State Pair 1:
Bihar
0.2
0.05 4.9 11.4
Jharkhand (New state) 0.65 3.6 6.3
State Pair 2:
Madhya Pradesh
0.4
0.35 4.7 7.6
Chhattisgarh (New State) 0.54 3.1 8.6
State Pair 3:
Uttar Pradesh
0.05
0.02 4 6.8
Uttarakhand (New State) 0.23 4.6 12.3
This table reports the level and change in the proportion of natural resource rich constituencies (i.e, those with mining
deposits) after state reorganisation, as well as the level and change in growth rate (measured by gross state domestic prod-
uct), for each state. Figures for the annual growth rate of each state were obtained from the Planning Commission of India’s
figures for state-wise growth.
to difference out fixed, initial differences between units on either side of the border. Our identifying
assumption is, therefore, that the other (initial) underlying discontinuities at the cutoff (for example,
due to pre-defined administrative boundaries, like districting, or language differences) are not chang-
ing over time, so that the differenced estimates should be unbiased for the local average treatment
effect.
The results we obtain are striking. Specifically, NRR constituencies perform comparatively worse
in the seceding (new) states; economic outcomes for NRP constituencies, on the other hand, are less
affected by secession. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence of an interaction effect with natural re-
source density at state level: NRR ACs in seceding states that inherit a higher proportion of NRR ACs
perform worse relative to NRR ACs in the rump states. Our findings are supported at the aggregate level
by figures from the Planning Commission (Table 1, columns 3 and 4), which show that although on
average new states do better relative to rump states, post break up, we see heterogeneity in outcomes:
areas in new states that end up with a much larger abundance of natural resources (Jharkhand) do
worse than the rump state, while others perform better. The heterogeneity in outcomes at the local
and state level is mirrored in changes in the distribution of natural resources across the newly-formed
states. The heterogeneity in outcomes at the local and state level is mirrored in the distribution of
natural resources across the newly-formed states. Following breakup, the proportion of ACs that are
rich in mineral deposits is 65% in Jharkhand, up from 20% in the original, combined state (Table 1).
The corresponding figures for Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand are respectively 54% (up from 40%), and
23% (up from 5%). Thus, not only is the proportion of ACs that are natural resource rich higher for
Jharkhand than it is for the other two newly-formed states, but Jharkhand is also the new state that
experiences the largest natural endowment shock.5
5One can find parallel examples at the cross country level elsewhere. Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905. Oil was
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A natural candidate explanation for this pattern is the change in state-level political institutions
that followed from secession. And indeed our main finding of the interaction effect between natural
resource abundance created by secession at the state level together with natural resource abundance
at the assembly constituencies (AC) level is strongly suggestive of a channel flowing through a change
in the political relationship between states and natural resource rich ACs following secession. In the
case of India, this relationship is shaped by a number of features that are peculiar to the Indian context:
(i) property rights to natural resources belong to states rather than to ACs; (ii) power is concentrated
at the state level in terms of policing and public goods; (iii) royalty rates on minerals were very low in
the period we consider;6 (iv) there is a well-documented association between rent seeking, criminal
activity and the abundance of natural resources (Vaishnav 2017; Aidt et al. 2011).
Building on this picture, Section 3 models the differential effects of secession on NRR and NRP
districts as arising from a political bargain struck in NRR constituencies between state-level politi-
cians and local rent recipients who control local votes and exchange them for natural resource rents.
The greater is the proportion of NRR constituencies in the state, the greater is the state government’s
comparative dependence on votes that are delivered by local-level patrons in return for rents, and the
lower is political accountability in the state. State secession leads to a change in the proportion of
NRR districts within a state and thus in the comparative importance of votes from NRR constituen-
cies. As a result, states that inherit a comparatively large fraction of NRR districts can experience a
loss of political accountability following secession, which in turn can lead to more intense rent grab-
bing and worse economic outcomes in those areas. This is similar in spirit to the “preference dilution
effect” described in the literature on lobbying, whereby more centralised decision making can reduce
the power of lobbies to influence policies because of increased preference heterogeneity (e.g. de Melo
et al. 1993). Our theoretical framework suggests that, when resource endowments are particularly
high, they are more likely to lead to perverse outcomes.
The three instances of state breakup that we study translate into only six observed changes in the
proportion of NRR districts within the new states by comparison with the original state. Neverthe-
less, the patterns that we see in the data are in line with our interpretation that the effects we see
come from the interplay of politics and natural resources. We see differential effects for NRR districts
varying according to their political leanings. Further corroboration comes from investigating how the
comparative performance of NRP and NRR districts varies with the election cycle: secession changes
how the comparative performance of NRP and NRR districts vary over the cycle. These additional
findings provides suggestive evidence that this performance gap is shaped by a political channel and
that this channel is affected by political secession. It is also consistent with our interpretation of the
effects of state breakup on the relationship between actors in NRR districts and state-level politicians.
As we discuss later, these changes in performance between NRR and NRP areas are hard to reconcile
with alternative explanations.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional context.
Section 3 presents a theoretical model that links political structure with the governance of natural
resources. Section 4 presents the data used for analysis and lays out the identification strategy for
estimating the effect of breakup. Sections 5 and 6 report the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
discovered much later in the 1970s, following which Norway’s growth rate went down from 6.3% to 1.1%, measured over the
period 1961 to 2016, while Sweden went from 5.7% to 3.2% over the same period (World Bank). More recent cases include
the secession of South Sudan in 2011 with extensive oil resources but facing conflict and negative rates of growth (World
Bank).
6Royalty rates here are not directly comparable to other international rates since they are based on weight rather than
value. Shortly after the breakup, in 2004-05, royalty revenues as percentage of total revenue varied from 3.7% in Madhya
Pradesh to about 12.5% in natural resource rich Jharkhand.
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2 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
2.1 THE GOVERNANCE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN INDIA
India has a federal structure, with both national and state assemblies. Members of the twenty-nine
state assemblies are elected in a first past-the-post system. The leader of the majority party or coalition
is responsible for forming the state government. States have executive, fiscal and regulatory powers
over a range of subjects that include education, health, infrastructure and law and order.
There is an overlap in authority between the federal government and state governments in the
governance of natural resource extraction, with both exerting regulatory authority: major minerals
such as coal and iron ore are regulated by the central government, while minor minerals are entirely
under state control as laid down in the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation (MMDR) Act
of 1957. Royalty revenues accrue to state budgets, but rates are set by the central government, which
controls rates on output as well as any “dead rent” that accrues in the absence of extraction, and also
decides on environmental clearances for mining. Property rights to land reside in the states, which
are the legal owners of all major mineral resources (except uranium), and claim all royalties. The main
power of the states derives from the legal authority to grant licenses. However, until recently, there
was no requirement for the royalties and returns from mining to accrue to local areas and the entire
proceeds accrue to the state budget.7 There are thus three players involved in royalty on minerals:
the Central Government which fixes the royalty rate, mode and frequency of revision; the State Gov-
ernment, which collects and appropriates royalty; and the lessee who might be in either the public
or private sector and who pays the royalty according to the rates and terms fixed by the centre to the
State.
The split of authority between federal and state agencies with respect to the governance of natural
resources means that the effects of policy decisions at each level are not fully internalised. The roy-
alty rates set by the central government are widely seen as being inefficiently low,8 lowering incentives
for states to allocate extraction rights to efficient operators and to police illegal mining, since royalties
from mining contribute so little to their budgets: royalty revenues in these states, as a percentage of to-
tal revenue, averaged to two percent in 2009, while the mining sector’s share of state domestic product
is an average of 10-11 percent for Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh over the period 2004-2011 (Chakraborty
and Garg 2015). Low royalty rates also mean that there is little scope for state politicians to translate
their control rights over natural resources directly into “political rents” for themselves (e.g. by using
royalty revenues to finance popular public projects or transfers), which in turn means that in order to
do so they must use indirect channels to do so (e.g. using allocating natural resource rights to buttress
political support). The fact that the authority for policing resides with the state governments while the
federal government decides on which areas can host mining activity produces incentives to evade en-
vironmental regulations by operating outside the areas given clearance by the federal government. All
of this has led to conflict between Centre and State about the weak policing and monitoring by state
governments.9 Given this institutional context, the politics of resource extraction in India takes on
a different flavour from that seen in some other federal states. Natural resource rents are controlled
by local operators but power resides at the state level- in particular, as mentioned before, the pro-
vision of education, health, law and order and rural electrification is firmly under state control. This
7The recent Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Ordinance, 2015 provides for the creation of
a District Mineral Foundation (DMF) and a National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET), funded by a percentage of royalties
paid by lessees and in principle, affording some re-distribution to local communities.
8It is difficult to compare royalty rates with international rates as the latter are mostly ad valorem while in India royalty
rates have been based on weight until recently. A switch to ad valorem rates in 2009 increased revenues on iron ore ten times
(Vanden Eynde 2015).
9For an article which discusses the difficulties of Centre/State coordination in policing, see http://bit.ly/1OHFIRM.
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institutional setting creates the conditions for state-level politicians and local leaders to strike a politi-
cal bargain where they trade “subterranean rents” for loyalty and votes.10 This link between state-level
politicians and local rent-seekers is incontrovertible: the political scientist Milan Vaishnav documents
this in detail in his account of the criminality of politicians (Vaishnav 2017). He argues that the rising
cost of elections and a shadowy election financing system where parties and candidates under-report
collections and expenses means that parties prefer “self-financing candidates who do not represent a
drain on the finite party coffers but instead contribute ‘rents’ to the party”; and tells of how, in the state
of Jharkhand, the minister in charge of mines (Koda) once disposed of 48 cases in one hour. Indeed,
the corruption is so institutionalised that one of the chairmen of Coal India in West Bengal says that
ministers would fix monthly payment targets with senior executives of Coal India and this was one of
the main sources of funding for political parties. According to some reports almost 15-20% of mining
revenues are creamed off every month (see Spectator Magazine, 2009).
At the local level, natural resource rents give rise to widely documented forms of “rent grabbing”,
both legal and illegal. Legalised rent grabbing consists of comparatively less efficient but politically
connected producers successfully securing resource extraction rights.11 Illegal rent grabbing mainly
consists of illegal mining. Collusion of local “rent grabbing entrepreneurs” with corrupt state-level
politicians is required to sustain either form of rent grabbing.12 Not only do states grant licenses and
leases, but the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act 1957 empowers state and central
government officers to enter and inspect any mine at any time. Thus, illegally extracting minerals
from these areas requires a degree of endorsement from the state – e.g. the police turning a blind eye
to illegal activity, or favouritism in allocating leases. These rent grabbing activities generate visible
economic costs for local economies, ranging from losses in production efficiency and a deterioration
of law and order, to environmental degradation, displacement of local residents, disruption of local
infrastructure — all leading to a crowding out of other economic activities (Baland and Francois 2000,
Mehlum et al. 2006).13
The lack of response by state-level governments to such rent-grabbing, despite the fact that they
have jurisdiction over all mining matters, suggests that there is a bargain being struck, in NRR ACs,
between state-level politicians and the local-level political entrepreneurs/patrons, with payments for
concessions made by politicians in relation to natural resource rents – directly, through the allocation
of mining rights, and indirectly, through lax controls on how those rights are managed at the local
level – taking the form of either bribes or increased political support from local constituencies. The
10Indeed, many times the local rent grabbing entrepreneurs become politicians themselves. Asher and Novosad (2016)
documents how local mineral rent shocks cause both adverse selection and worse behaviour of politicians in office. They
describe how local politicians have direct control over mining operations from which they derive rents. Aidt et al. (2011)
shows how stiff competition between parties in India creates an inherent advantage for criminal politicians who can buy
votes or intimidate voters.
11The allocation process itself, however, is often fraught with irregularities: in 2014 the Supreme court ruled that more
than 214 out of 218 coal licences awarded by governments between 1993-2010 were illegal (see BBC News).
12The Shah Commission Report available at http://www.mines.nic.in provides an ongoing saga of the types of ex-
cesses that go on in mining areas.
13As a specific example, take the case of coal: “It is a murky subculture that entwines the coal mafia, police, poor villagers,
politicians, unions and Coal India officials. Coal workers pay a cut to crime bosses to join their unions, which control access
to jobs, according to law-enforcement and industry officials. Unions demand a ‘goon tax’ from buyers, a fixed fee per tonne,
before loading their coal. Buyers must bribe mining companies to get decent-quality coal. The mafia pays off company
officials, police, politicians and bureaucrats to mine or transport coal illegally.... Corruption is largely local: “The rackets in-
clude controlling unions and transport, manipulating coal auctions, extortion, bribery and outright theft of coal. Popularly
known as the ‘coal mafia’, their tentacles even reach into state-run Coal India, the world’s largest coal miner, its chairman
told Reuters.” (from Reuters Special Report 2013). For other accounts, see http://www.firstpost.com/india/sukma-
maoist-attack-malaise-of-naxal-violence-lies-deep-in-illegal-mining-and-political-funding-
3408728.html. Also see https://www.spectator.co.uk/2009/09/the-dark-heart-of-indias-economic-
rise/ and http://www.scottcarney.com/article/fire-in-the-hole/.
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latter relies on local rent recipients being able, through either persuasion or coercion of local voters,
to deliver a certain volume of votes to whichever candidate or party they choose.
Vote buying is pervasive in India, not only in NRR constituencies (see, e.g., Mitra et al. 2017); and it
often involves handing out gifts or money prior to elections. Nevertheless, there are reasons to expect
that this exchange of votes for favours to happen comparatively more in NRR ACs. This is because
the state-level government controls the allocation of rights for the exploitation of natural resources
as well as the enforcement of exploitation rights, but, as discussed earlier, due to the low royalty rates
that are set by the federal government, the implications of these decisions for state-level revenues
are negligible. State-level politicians thus have control over something that is very valuable to local
operators but involves little economic opportunity cost for state budgets, making it a natural currency
to be spent in a votes-for-favours transaction. Natural-resource poor (NRP) constituencies lack such
currency.14
A symptom of the high prevalence of patronage politics in NRR areas is the higher likelihood of
criminal politicians being elected in mineral rich constituencies. Table 10 shows that, in a sample
of 179 Parliamentary Constituencies (electing federal level MPs), the likelihood of a politician with a
criminal record being elected is increasing in the density of mines in that constituency (the coefficient
from a simple OLS specification is positive and significant at the 5% level). There is also evidence, as
shown in Table 10, that vote buying and electoral fraud takes place relatively more in the mineral rich
areas: using survey responses from the State Election Survey for Jharkhand in 2005, which posed ques-
tions to individual voters about perceptions of voting malpractices, and running a logit specification
of perceived voting malpractice within a district against the number of mines within that district, in-
cluding district fixed effects and controls for household characteristics, gives a coefficient of 0.28 that
is significant at the 1% level.
2.2 EXOGENEITY OF BORDERS AND THE TIMING OF STATE BREAKUP
Tillin (2013) explores how the breakup of existing states in 2001 came about. She suggests four possi-
ble explanations. The first explanation proffered is that of distinct cultural identities in the breakaway
areas that have consistently made demands for secession, demands that have progressively gained
prominence since 1947. The basis on which state borders were originally drawn by the State Reorgan-
isation Act of 1956 was along linguistic boundaries, but this criterion tended to ignore other ethnic
and social boundaries, leading to large tribal populations in some states seeing themselves as ethni-
cally distinct and socially neglected. It should be noted, however, that the sharp distinctions along
ethnic, social and linguistic lines, in pre-independence have been reduced in time, since migration
and changing demographics have meant more homogeneity particularly along existing sub-regional
or district borders – this point is explored in further detail below when we examine the balancing of
characteristics along the border between states (see Table 2). Furthermore, not all these demands
were centred around statehood, but they did involve claims for more local representation and local
management of natural resources, both mines and forestries.15 Second, and tied closely to our expla-
nation here, Tillin suggests that natural resources were a factor: private interests might have consid-
ered it easier to increase resource extraction and intensify production in a smaller jurisdiction, which
14This can be viewed as an extreme case of a more general scenario where vote trading can take place in all constituencies
but comparatively more so in natural-resource rich ones.
15Tillin (2013) writes “All three of the regions that became states in 2000 saw the emergence of distinctive types of social
movement in the early 1970s: Chipko, the people’s forestry movement in the Uttarakhand hills; the trade union movement
among miners, the Chhattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh; and the worker-peasantry movement in Jharkhand led by the Jhark-
hand Mukti Morcha (JMM). In all three cases, the issues raised by social movements related primarily to the role of the state
in the management of natural resources and the rights of local communities to substantive economic inclusion.”
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she terms “extension of capitalist interests”.16 The third explanation relates to the changing federal
election context since 1989, when the leading coalition partner, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), first
favoured granting statehood to boost their popularity in the areas concerned. This is plausible but as
we explain below, a decade later all political parties had reached a consensus on agreeing secession in
these states (Kumar 2010). A final explanation is that the sheer size of the old states made them diffi-
cult to govern and that the breakup was attractive to the central government because it meant better
governance and more ease of administration – as well as an acknowledgement of local identities.
The list of explanations Tillin (2013) offers for the 2001 breakup flags two potential difficulties in
looking at secession as a true natural experiment. The first relates to how borders between the rump
state and the breakaway state were determined. This turns out not to be an issue at all because the
boundaries of these three new entities have never been in dispute; the areas comprising the new states
were separate entities before independence from British rule in 1947. For instance, Sharma (1976) dis-
cusses a memorandum to the State reorganisation commission in 1955 asking for a separate state of
Jharkhand, naming the six districts in Bihar that were eventually separated from Bihar in 2000 (Haz-
aribagh, Ranchi, Palamu, Singhbhum, Santhal Parganas and Dhanbad, then Manbhum).17 The Ut-
tarakhand Kranti Dal, the regional party formed in 1979 for a separate hill state was determined to
unite the eight hill districts in a separate entity. The borders of Uttarakhand were thus determined by
the borders of the eight hill districts that maintained their separate identity on the basis of geography
and cultural distinctiveness; again, these borders were not in dispute. The borders of Chhattisgarh
comprised the eighteen districts where Chhattisgarhi was spoken, and, again, these district borders
have remained the same since independence.18 However, a key challenge for identification is that de-
spite the fact that the demarcation was determined in the past, differences across the borders might
have evolved over time; this is examined further in Table 2 and in Section 5.1.
The second potential difficulty pertains to the timing of the breakup. This timing was determined
by the success of the BJP at the National elections in 1998. The BJP had led a minority government in
1996 and had promised to grant statehood to the three new states if it was returned to power. It was
returned again at the head of a coalition government, but by this time there was a general consensus
both at national and state levels: the other leading party of the Congress supported the change, as
did the state assemblies of the original states before breakup. While there might have been a initial
spurt of political activity by the BJP,19 by this time there was little political opposition anywhere to
the demands for statehood. In fact, these demands had grown less vociferous since the early 1990s
because it was clear that all the major parties were in accord. Part of this unanimity lay in the fact
that all three new states lie well within the external boundaries of India and thus posed little threat to
the Union of India, and, equally important, it was clear that there was no political gain to any of the
parties in opposing secession. It might be thought that the timing of breakup was related to particular
advantages of the party in power at the Centre; however, given the consensus across parties and the
16Tillin (2013) summarises the views, both pre and post breakup, of Tata Steel, the major investor in Jharkhand, and that
of other industrialists. Tata Steel was happier with a larger state where “politicians were farther away in Bihar” and less likely
to meddle, while others favoured a smaller state where they hoped there would be better law and order and less corruption.
However, seven years after secession, things were perhaps even worse in the new state according to them. In brief, there
were clearly mixed views and, far from the urge to expand resource extraction, issues of infrastructure, electricity provision
and law and order loomed large in favouring breakup and evaluating its success.
17It was the case that the borders were formally decided so as to include the districts that consisted of ‘Scheduled Areas’ as
defined in the Constitution, which in turn may have followed the Simon commission of 1930 that defined certain ‘partially
excluded areas’. The list of scheduled areas (which are still mentioned as part of the old states) is available at the Ministry of
Tribal affairs website here http://tribal.nic.in/Content/StatewiseListofScheduleAreasProfiles.aspx.
18Since 2012 these borders have been redrawn to give nine new districts.
19The BJP and its previous incarnation, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh had always opposed any state breakup until the 1990s,
and therefore their agreement was perhaps of note only because of the change; other leading parties had by then allowed
that this was desirable (Mawdsley 2002).
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fact that state assemblies pre breakup gave their willing assent to the breakup without much dissent,
this also turns out to be a non-issue (Kumar 2010).
Finally, given that we concentrate on the role of resources, it should be emphasised that the prices
of minerals played little part in the timing: mineral prices worldwide see a surge only after 2004, four
years after breakup. In summary, neither the borders of the states nor the timing of breakup can be
traced to any particular economic or political advantage for the breakaway states.
2.3 POLITICAL REORGANISATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES
In our empirical analysis, we ask how the relative economic performance of natural resource rich and
natural resource poor areas was affected by secession. Unlike in the Brazilian case studied by Brollo
et al. (2013) and by Caselli and Michaels (2013), state breakup in the Indian case could not have pro-
duced windfall revenues at the local level that could have directly encouraged direct appropriation of
rents.20 As we have discussed in Section 2, the political bargain between local and state level leaders
might be mediated through bribes or votes. In the Indian case, however, there is no clear reason to
expect bribery incentives to be much affected by secession, given that state breakup does not change
the economic value of mining concessions and that the influence of state politicians on the allocation
of rents remains unchanged.
On the other hand, political reorganisation might directly affect incentives to exchange natural re-
source rents for local political support. A direct, mechanical effect of secession is a change in the struc-
ture of political competition within states: each new state features fewer districts, each accounting for
a larger share of the total votes. Then, if control over natural resources is used by state politicians as a
means of securing political support in relevant districts, it is plausible that secession, by changing the
relative political weight of NRR constituencies within the new states, would change the calculation of
the political costs and benefits involved. And indeed, if we look at how secession has affected the com-
parative density of natural resource districts across states, we see that the change in some cases has
been dramatic: in the case of Bihar, for example, about 65% of all districts in the newly formed state of
Jharkhand are natural resource rich, whereas the corresponding proportion pre-breakup was 20% (see
Column 2, Table 1). In contrast, the state pair 3 (Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand) begins with a very
small endowment of resources and while the split benefited the new state, it should be emphasised
that a larger share of a small endowment did not benefit it greatly.
We formalise this idea in the next section.
3 POLITICAL SECESSION, NATURAL RESOURCES AND VOTE TRADING
This section presents a stylised theoretical political-economy framework that derives predictions on
how the changes in the concentration of natural resources brought about by secession can translate
into changes in economic outcomes at the local level. The key idea underlying our modelling exercise
is that the adverse effects of the political influence exerted by special interest groups grows stronger
the smaller is the proportion of competing interests that might act to mitigate them.
The specific mechanism we model relates to an electoral accountability channel that operates at
the state level, which arises from a bargaining game in NRR ACs involving vote sellers/patrons at the
local level and vote buyers or parties at the state level (above and beyond the kind of vote buying
20Anecdotal evidence suggests that most corruption takes place at the stage of the allocation of licences, and
that only a fraction of actual production of minerals is officially reported – see, e.g., https://www.spectator.
co.uk/2009/09/the-dark-heart-of-indias-economic-rise/ and http://www.scottcarney.com/article/
fire-in-the-hole/.
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that might occur in any constituency independently of its natural resource endowments). The more
valuable the votes are, the higher will be the concessions (the “price” paid for votes) to local level
intermediaries. These concessions generate negative economic spillovers on the rest of the economy,
which erode political support in the electorate, translating into political costs that must be balanced
against the political gains that directly come from securing votes through patronage politics in the
NRR ACs. State secession changes the distribution of NRR and NRP ACs within the newly formed
states and thus alters the political trade-offs involved in vote buying, which in turn affects economic
outcomes in NRR and NRP ACs.
We begin our discussion by presenting a single-state model of vote selling in political equilibrium
and then extend it to characterise effects of secession.
3.1 VOTES FOR SALE AND NATURAL RESOURCE DENSITY
Policy Preferences
Consider first a single state with a continuum of mass one of constituencies with populations of iden-
tical size. A fraction q ∈ (0, 1) of all constituencies are natural resource rich (NRR) constituencies; the
remaining fraction, 1− q , of constituencies are natural resource poor (NRP) and have no natural re-
sources.
Each voter in each constituency has an ex-ante ideal point, i , in ideology/policy space [−1/2, 1/2]≡
I , with i being uniformly distributed over the support I in each constituency. A voter’s utility is quadrat-
ically decreasing in the distance between her ideal policy, i , and the actual policy, i ′: the payoff levels
a voter i obtains from policy i ′ is −(i − i ′)2.
Two parties, L (the incumbent) and R (the challenger), compete in state-level elections. The win-
ning party, j ∈ {L , R }, obtains political rents, W , which we assume to be unity without loss of gener-
ality. The incumbent party thus aims at maximising expected political rents, P Wj W = P
W
j , where P
W
j
is the probability of party j winning.
Party L has an exogenously specified platform located at−1/2 in ideology space, while party R has
an exogenously specified platform located at 1/2. The payoff levels a voter i obtains if L and R win the
election are thus respectively U Li =−(−1/2− i )2, and U Ri =−(1/2− i )2, with the median ideology voter
(i = 0) being indifferent between the two parties. Additionally, there is a stochastic ideology shock, s ,
the same in all constituencies and uniformly distributed in [−1/2, 1/2], that shifts the ex-post ideology
of voter i to i + s .21
Voters vote sincerely. For a given ideology shock, s , the shares of votes that are cast respectively
for L and R are therefore equal to 1/2 − s and 1/2 + s ; and so, in the absence of any vote trading,
the probability of party L party winning coincides with the probability of s being negative and the
probability of party R winning is the probability of s being positive, both of which are equal to 1/2,
given the assumed distribution of ideology shocks.22
21This incumbency related shock could be thought of, for example, as being linked to a common but unpredictable as-
sessment by voters of the incumbent’s performance while in office. s is a shock in favour of the R party.
22We can assume that if s = 0 each of the two parties wins with equal probability; but since this is a measure zero event, it
makes no difference to the analysis.
10
The Price of Votes
In each NRR constituency, a local leader controls, through intimidation or persuasion, a fraction, v ∈
(0, 1/2), of the total votes.23 (In Appendix B we discuss an extension in which there is a continuous
distribution of natural resources across jurisdictions and where the proportion, q , of ACs where vote
sales take place is endogenised on the basis of an economic calculation linking the value of natural
resource rents with the cost of procuring votes.) The given tranche of votes, v , can only be delivered
to a single party for a price, x . This price is a payment in kind consisting of targeted, natural resource
related concessions that translate into rents for the sellers, such as, for example, granting exploitation
rights, as well as relaxing restrictions and policing of abuses by those exploiting the natural resources
illegally. The net economic value of these concessions to the sellers is z x (z > 0). The price can be
delivered to the seller only if the vote buyer wins the election: the seller’s expected payoff if votes are
sold to party j for a price x is therefore P Wj z x .
The rent grabbing activities associated with the payment generate a loss of λ x for those voters in
the constituency who do not partake in them, as well as negative spillovers of ρx for voters in other
constituencies. What we have in mind here are all the negative effects from unregulated mining –
such as environmental degradation, underground coal fires that can interfere with other economic
activities, intimidation by criminal gangs that enable rent extraction (Asher and Novosad 2016) – as
well as the economic costs associated with extraction rights being allocated to less efficient operators
or granted on deposits that should not be exploited on the basis of an economic calculation of social
costs and benefits.24
Because of these adverse effects, the favours that are delivered in exchange for votes entail a po-
litical opportunity cost for the buyer: since the losses associated with the exchange only occur upon
delivery of the promised payment if the party that buys the votes is elected, they have the same effect
as that of an ideology shift of corresponding magnitude amongst independent voters against the party
that buys the votes. Specifically, suppose that all the votes that are available for sale in all constituen-
cies are purchased by a single party, and that the transaction can be observed by voters;25 independent
voters in NRR constituencies would then anticipate an overall loss (λ+ρq ) x from a win by that party,
whereas the prospective loss for for voters in NRP constituencies is ρq x .
The buyer, in its calculation, must balance off this loss of political support amongst independent
voters against the electoral advantage of being able to secure a fraction of the votes directly through
vote buying. In NRR constituencies the political cost arising from the promised delivery of the pay-
ment is offset by the political gain from buying votes, but in NRP constituencies it is not. Because
of this asymmetry, an increase in the proportion, q , of NRR constituencies makes vote buying more
attractive, raising the equilibrium price of the votes that are available for sale:
Proposition 1: Consider the a single (collusive) vote seller making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a single
buyer. The unique payoff maximising price for the seller is x˜ =
v
λ (1− v ) +ρ (1−q v ) . This price is de-
creasing in ρ and increasing in q , and its elasticity with respect to changes in q is also increasing in q .
The corresponding equilibrium values of P WL are also decreasing in ρ and increasing in q .
23For accounts of the extent to which local leaders exert control upon the votes of local populations, see Rao (1983) and
Singh and Harriss-White (2019).
24For example, blasting and drilling around the coal mines lead to water aquifers drying up, air and noise pollution leading
to a shortage of clean drinking water and water borne diseases to increase, loss of forest reserves, loss of agricultural land,
disruption of economic activity by Maoist insurgents (Chauhan 2010). These effects would not be limited only to mining
regions but would spill over to neighbouring NRP ACs – particularly SO2 emissions, pollution of surface water, spillovers
from criminal activities and insurgency.
25Indian voters are well aware of which parties or politicians receive the support of NR lobbies (Arjjumend 2004).
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(The proof is in Appendix B.)
Allowing for multiple buyers or sellers does not change conclusions. The results of Proposition
1 carry over to a scenario where neither party has all the bargaining power – e.g., under sequential
bargaining with alternating offers (Rubinstein 1982). Both extensions are discussed in Appendix B.
An increase in the density of natural resources, via a political channel, raises x and thus lowers
economic performance (welfare) in NRR constituencies (for individuals other than the vote sellers),
as well as in NRP constituencies, albeit to a lesser extent. The intuition for this result is as follows.
In its choice of x , the incumbent party balances the net gain in vote share from raising x in NRR
constituencies with the net loss in NRP constituencies. As the proportion of NRR constituencies (q )
becomes larger – and the proportion of NRP constituencies (1−q ) becomes smaller – the positive vote
gains from vote buying in NRR constituencies increasingly come to dominate the political “dilution”
effect that comes from the purely negative political spillovers in NRP constituencies, and so the net
political value of vote buying (and hence the maximum price that can be paid for it) increases.
Proposition 1 also implies that the dilution effect fades progressively faster as q increases: intu-
itively, the strength of the diluting influence of NRP constituencies is related to the ratio (1− q )/q ,
which decreases with q at at an increasing rate (in absolute value). As a result, the adverse effects of
an increase in the proportion of NRR ACs become progressively larger.
3.2 EFFECTS OF STATE BREAKUP
State breakup can produce a change in the proportion of NRR districts within the new states relative to
the original state. The predictions we have derived in the previous section for a single-state scenario
thus translate into predictions on the effects of state breakup on governance outcomes – predictions
that in principle could be tested empirically in longitudinal evidence on pre- and post-secession out-
comes.
Consider a unified state, U , with a unit mass of constituencies, a fraction qU of which are NRR con-
stituencies; and suppose that the unified state breaks up into two new equally-sized states, A and B ,
each with a mass of 1/2 constituencies and proportions qA and qB of NRR constituencies. Then, focus-
ing only on the component of utility that depends on x , welfare for a citizen i in a NRP constituency
in state H ∈ {A, B } can be expressed as
U N R PH =−ρ qH xH +γq−H x−H2 , H ∈ {A, B }; (1)
while that for the citizen in a NRR constituency is
U N R RH =U
N R P
H −λxH , H ∈ {A, B }, (2)
where γ< 1 reflects a reduction in transboundary spillovers coming from the separation of state insti-
tutions, and (qA +qB )/2 = qU .26
Votes in H only affect xH , and so only the terms that involve xH in (1) and (2) are relevant for
characterising voting choices in H . In turn, xH depends on qH via the equilibrium condition described
in Proposition 1.
We are then in a position to draw conclusions concerning how secession affects economic perfor-
mance via the political channel described in 3.1 (i.e. abstracting for the time being from effects directly
associated with the redistribution of revenues from natural resources):
26We abstract from any idiosyncratic component of utility stemming both from ideology and from other factors that do
not depend on xH .
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Proposition 2: The ratio U N R PA /U
N R P
B and U
N R R
A /U
N R P
A are both increasing in qA/qB . As levels of
utility are normalised in the model to be negative, this means that, following secession:
(i) comparing across states, U N R PA is smaller, relative to U
N R P
B , the larger is qA relative to qB ;
(ii) within state A, U N R RA is smaller, relative to U
N R R
A , the larger is qA relative to qB .
(The proof is in Appendix B.)
This result follows immediately from our analysis of a single-state scenario. A higher proportion of
natural resource rich districts within a state worsens the quality of governance, and hence economic
performance, in that state. To the extent that spillover effects across states are weaker than those
within states, this implies that, when we consider only those effects of natural resources that flow
through a governance channel, an unequal allocation of NRR districts following secession penalises
the state that receives the larger share (prediction 2.(i)); and, more specifically, worsens the compara-
tive economic performance of NRR areas relative to that of NRP areas (prediction 2.(ii)). As explained
in the introduction, this is similar to a “preference dilution effect” whereby more centralised decision
making reduces the power of lobbies to influence policies. In our particular context, secession has
similar effects to decentralisation where the power of local rent seeking lobbies in NRR ACs increases
relative to other interest groups when their relative weight increases.
Proposition 2 isolates those effects of secession that flow through the political channel we have
described in 2.1, but secession also produces effects that flow directly through the redistribution of
natural resource revenues. These effect relate to the change in the natural resource tax base base,
(qA − qU )r , where r is total income from natural resources in a representative NRR ACs. An increase
in q relative to its pre-secession level produces an increase in the tax base (relative to the size of the
new state), which may either translate into more provision of public goods, either state-wide or at the
NRR AC level, or, alternatively, into a lower level of taxation holding the level of public goods provision
constant, leaving more disposable income within NRR ACs.27 Through this effect, an increase in q
can potentially raise economic performance in the new state, and, more specifically, in NRR ACs; and
indeed, as discussed, the reallocation of revenues from natural resources is often a primary motivation
for secession demands.
Proposition 1 says that the effects of an increase in q on x increase with q – as the diluting influence
of the remaining fraction, 1− q , of NRP ACs becomes progressively smaller, the elasticity of x with
respect to changes in 1 becomes larges, (i.e. the cost associated with a higher q is convex in q ). And
so, if the post-secession level of q A is large enough, the adverse governance effects of an increase in
q A , as described by Proposition 2, are more likely to dominate any other positive effects (such as those
effects that are associated with an increase in the tax base, which is linear in q ), leading to NRR ACs
doing comparatively worse than NRP ACs in state A post secession (result 2.(ii)):
Proposition 3: Political secession is more likely to lead to a deterioration in the comparative economic
performance of NRR ACs relative to that of NRP ACs of the breakaway state the larger is the density of
natural resources in the breakaway state post secession.
The predictions of the theory in relation to the effects of political secession can be summarised as
follows:
27There may be other effects of the breakup on economic performance that are independent of the endowment of natural
resources – effects that our analysis abstracts from. For example, the smaller size of each state post breakup might make
administration easier, as well as allowing a better representation of the electorate.
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• an increase in the proportion of NRR (q ) in a breakaway state following secession will weaken the
diluting effect that NRP areas exert on the political influence of natural resource rents recipients
in NRR areas and lower the quality of governance and thus economic performance;
• this effect is more likely to dominate other positive effects associated with increased ownership
of natural resources in the breakaway state (and result in a comparative worsening in the eco-
nomic performance of NRR ACs relative to that of NRP ACs) the larger is q in the breakaway state
post secession.
4 DATA
To study how differences in local outcomes (assembly constituency level) relate to natural resources
we rely on two main data sources.
First, we rely on luminosity data to proxy for the evolution of economic activity (Henderson et al.
2011; Chen and Nordhaus 2011; Kulkarni et al. 2011; Alesina et al. 2016), over the period 1992-
2010, thus covering the pre-breakup period 1992-2001, and the post-breakup period 2002-2010.28 The
data consist of imaging of stable lights obtained as a global annual cloud free composite where the
ephemeral lights from fires and other sources are removed and the data are averaged and quantified
in six bits, which in turn might result in saturation for urban settings but does mean that dimmer lights
in rural settings are captured. Each grid (one sq. km) is assigned a digital number (DN) ranging from
0 to 63 and luminosity is measured as the DN3/2. Luminosity is thus obtained as a sum of lights over
the gridded area which in our case is defined as the Assembly Constituency (AC), using GIS data on
the administrative boundaries of states and ACs.29
There are three main reasons why we rely on luminosity data. The first is that panel data on house-
holds, by assembly constituencies30 that could capture the evolution of incomes or consumption pre
and post breakup does not exist. The second reason is that, despite the measurement difficulties in-
herent in the use of such a proxy, there is convincing evidence to suggest that luminosity is strongly cor-
related with standard socio-economic outcomes. We offer corroborative evidence for this by looking at
the relationship between luminosity and these measures; in brief, we use data on income, wealth and
education from the National Election Survey in the year 2004, which surveys voters at the constituency
level to examine the correlation of standard economic indicators with luminosity. The correlation with
wealth is about 0.6, while that with income and education lies between 0.4 and 0.45.31 This relation-
ship also holds at the more aggregate level of the district: Chaturvedi et al. (2011) and Bhandari and
Roychowdhury (2011) examine this correlation at the district level in India and find similar effects. We
restrict our analysis to the years 1992-2010 because constituency borders have since been re-drawn.32
The third (and most important) reason for relying on luminosity evidence is that our identification
28The night time image data is obtained from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Linescan System
(DMS P-OLS). The DMSP satellites collect a complete set of earth images twice a day at a nominal resolution of 0.56 km,
smoothed to blocks of 2.8 km (30 arc-seconds). The data, in 30 arc-second resolution (1km grid interval), covers 180◦ West
to 180◦ East longitude and 65◦ North to 65◦ South latitude.
29We are grateful to Sam Asher and Paul Novosad who provided the geographic data necessary for matching electoral
constituencies to mineral deposits which in turn comes from the MLInfomap Pollmap dataset, which contains digitised GIS
data based on maps published by the Election Commission of India.
30Districts are at a higher level of aggregation than assembly constituencies.
31The National Election Survey collects information from voters in each parliamentary constituency. To obtain the corre-
lations, we aggregate the night-time lights data to the parliamentary constituency level.
32The boundaries for constituencies were fixed in 1976 but new boundaries based on the 2001 census figures were meant
to be re-drawn. This was mandated by the Delimitation Act of 2002, which constituted a delimitation commission to redraw
the constituency boundaries. However, there was substantial delay in compiling the necessary data and in creating the
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strategy focuses on changes in outcomes rather than levels. This means that sources of persistent het-
erogeneity across ACs in the relationship between luminosity levels and levels of economic activity
are not a concern.
To corroborate our measure of night-time lights, we use data from two waves (1992 and 2004) of
the India Human Development Survey (IHDS). Finally we also use data from the Census of India, state
election results (obtained from the Election Commission of India) and state electricity prices (obtained
from India Stat) to support our identification strategy, described in the next subsection. Appendix A
provides further details on these data sources.
The second type of data we use are data on the location, type and size of mineral deposits from the
Mineral Atlas of India (Geological Survey of India, 2001).33 Minerals are grouped into nine categories,
and each commodity is classified by size, which is proportional to the estimated reserve of the deposit.
The definition of the size categories for each commodity is in terms of metric tons of the substances
of reserves contained before exploitation or actual output. This provides comprehensive information
about the mineral resource potential of the deposits.34
We use data on location specific mineral resources or deposits, rather than their value, to avoid is-
sues of endogeneity: the price of minerals found in these deposits is time-varying and can be affected
by various unobservables such as election cycles, and other demand and supply factors that tend to
be correlated with growth and inequality. Also, our empirical strategy relies on a spatial discontinu-
ity design with comparisons across borders over time where deposit types are similar, obviating the
need to examine values. Furthermore, as will be clear below, our fixed-effects strategy allows us to
net out the fixed location specific unobservables associated with deposit coverage. Further, the loca-
tion of deposits is strictly of geological origin, and the location was mapped before 1975 and hence its
exploration cannot be thought to be controlled by subsequent political and economic incentives or
institutional factors.
4.1 IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
In what follows, we conventionally define ACs in the states that have broken away as those that are
“treated” by the act of secession. Admittedly, the rump state is also a new creation and is thus affected
by the treatment; so, what we are actually picking up are the differential effects of the treatment (se-
cession) between old and new states.35 As evidenced by Table 1, the new states are those that inherit
a disproportionate number of NRR ACs, and so ”treatment” for an AC can also be interpreted as be-
longing to a state that experiences an increase in the proportion of its NRR districts (corresponding to
an increase in q in our theoretical model). To identify the effect of state breakup on development out-
comes, we make use of the geographic discontinuity at the boundaries of each pre-breakup state and
employ a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). For each geographic location, assignment to “treat-
ment” (or new state) was determined entirely on the basis of their location. This key feature of the
state breakup allows us to employ a sharp regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect
of secession on growth. Such a discontinuity is clearly supported by Figure 3, where local polyno-
new boundaries, the first election with redrawn boundaries was only held in Karnataka in 2008. Consequently, the period
between 1976 and 2009 in these states had fixed constituencies boundaries allowing for the comparison of luminosity across
time.
33Resources are usually classified as point resources and dispersed resources, the former being the most easily appropri-
ated. Our focus in this paper is on minerals that are point source resources.
34We are particularly grateful to Sam Asher for sharing his data obtained from the Mineral Atlas and to officials at the
Geological Survey of India, Bangalore for clarifying the observations on size.
35This convention is also consistent with the idea that the rump state retains the old institutions and government struc-
tures while the new state must create new structures, even if similar to those in the rump state. Rump states saw no reor-
ganisation apart from the loss of territories and thus a lower population and smaller administration.
15
mial estimates of the growth in light intensity – the variable relevant for our difference-in-difference
combined with RDD identification strategy described below – around the distance to the threshold
before and after breakup are displayed. Figure 4 assesses the validity of the identifying assumption
with the McCrory (2008) test for breaks in the density of the forcing variable at the treatment border
with negative distances to state border for old states and positive distances for new states. The figure
clearly shows that the density does not change discontinuously across the border, suggesting that for
the window around the coverage border there seems to be no manipulation. This is to be expected
given the firm exogeneity of the borders, but it is reassuring all the same.
We define a variable, Di , as constituency i ’s distance to the geographic border d that splits each
of these geographic location between old and new states. We then define an indicator for each AC for
belonging to the new state as
Ti =1[Di≥d ]. (3)
The discontinuity in the treatment status implies that local average treatment effects (LATE) are non-
parametrically identified (Hahn et al. 2001). Effectively we compare outcomes for constituencies on
either side of the geographic border that determined treatment assignment or being in a New State.
Formally, the average causal effect of the treatment at the discontinuity point is then given by (Imbens
and Lemieux 2008):
τa = lim
g→d +E[Yi t |Di = g ]− limg→d−E[Yi t |Di = g ] =E[Yi t (1)−Yi t (0) |Di = d ], (4)
where Yi t is the satellite light density of constituency i in year t .
An important feature to note in the above-mentioned design is that the discontinuity is geographi-
cal, i.e., it separates individuals (ACs) in different locations based on a threshold along a given distance-
based border. Using (4) to estimate the causal effect would ignore the two-dimensional spatial aspect
of the discontinuity. This is because the border line can be viewed as a collection of many points over
the entire distance spanned by the border. For example, an individual located north-west of the bor-
der is not directly comparable to an individual located south-east of the border. For the comparison
to be accurate, each “treatment” individual must be matched with “control” individuals who are in
close proximity to their own location and to the border line. We address this issue as follows. We di-
vide the border for each state into a collection of points defined by latitude and longitude spaced at
equal intervals of 15 kilometers. We then measure the distance of each AC to the border and include
polynomials of distance and its interactions with the treatment variable. We then condition on the
post-breakup interacted, border segment fixed effects in all the specifications, so that only ACs within
close proximity of each other are compared.36
The local average treatment effect can be estimated using local linear regression by including poly-
nomials of distance to the border (controlling for border segment fixed effects) to a sample of units
contained within a bandwidth distance h on either side of the discontinuity.
We additionally exploit the time dimension of our data as a further source of identification. The
identification strategy described so far exploits differences across nearby bordering units, post state
breakup to investigate the effect of breakup. Even then, it is possible that there is an underlying admin-
istrative discontinuity at the border cutoff in the absence of breakup, since the geographical border
was laid around existing districts. To address this issue, we use the observed jump in outcomes to dif-
ference out such fixed, initial differences between units on either side of the border. Our identifying
assumption is, therefore, that the jumps at the cutoff are not changing over time in the absence of
36See Black (1999), who first discussed the use of the border segments in a regression discontinuity framework. For a
recent application, see Dell (2010), who extends the approach to incorporate a semi-parametric regression discontinuity
design.
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Figure 3: Growth in light intensity after secession
The figure plots the local polynomial estimates of the growth in light intensity, defined
as the difference in average light intensity post (2001-2009) and pre (1992-2000) the
secession, around the threshold distance.
Figure 4: RD validity: density smoothness test for distance to state border
The figure plots test for density smoothness proposed by (McCrary 2008). The dis-
tances are normalised, such that positive values indicate distances for new states while
negative values indicate distances for old states.
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treatment, so that the differenced local Wald estimators will be unbiased for the local average treat-
ment effect.
Our overall identification strategy effectively combines the RDD design with a difference-in-difference
approach. A key identifying assumption of this empirical strategy is that of conditional common
trends before the secession for areas close to the border. We discuss this assumption further and ex-
amine its empirical validity in Section 5.4.
With this in mind, the specification we estimate is
Yi t =αi +βt +γTi ×Postt +δ′Vi t +ςs ×Postt + "i t , (5)
where Yi t is the satellite light density of AC i in year t . αi is the fixed effect for each AC. The variable
of interest, the new state effect, is denoted by the interaction of Ti , being located in the new state, and
Postt =1[t≥2001]. We control for border segment fixed effects, ςs (interacted with Postt to account for
the panel dimension). The terms αi and βt represent constituency and time fixed effects respectively.
The Vi t ’s are defined as
Vi t =

1[Di<d ]×Postt × (Di −d )
1[Di≥d ]×Postt × (Di −d )

. (6)
The regressors Vi t are introduced to avoid asymptotic bias in the estimates (Hahn et al. 2001, Imbens
and Lemieux 2008). Standard tests remain asymptotically valid when these regressors are added.
A panel fixed-effects estimator around the distance thresholds, h , is equivalent to using a uniform
kernel for local linear regression, as suggested by Hahn et al. (2001). We consider several bandwidths,
based on the optimal bandwidth calculations of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011), and for each we
derive OLS-FE estimates using observations lying within the respective distance thresholds.
5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 BORDER EXOGENEITY AND BALANCING TESTS OF COVARIATES
Our spatial discontinuity design compares ACs across borders, with the basic notion that differences
in patterns of local activity, controlling for time-invariant characteristics before breakup can only be
attributed to the secession rather than differences due to other factors. This in turn depends on the
variation in observable attributes including human and physical geography. The demarcation of the
borders here are historically determined, based on ethno-linguistic differences as they were present
in 1947 at independence, or even earlier. If the historical demarcation implies a different settlement
by these groups today, this in turn might pose a threat to identification.
To examine this we check how observed characteristics vary at different levels of aggregation across
borders, paying particular attention to differences within a narrow radius of the new-state border (see
for e.g., Lowes et al. 2017, for a discussion of a similar strategy). In Table 2, we present balancing tests
for each covariate based on both the full and restricted sample of observations. In our restricted sam-
ple, we limit the set of observations to a distance bandwidth of 200 km around the border (at the AC
level) or directly bordering districts (at the district level). For each type of sample-set we first report
the mean (in parenthesis the standard deviation) of the entire sample and then report the mean dif-
ferences between rump and new states (in parenthesis the standard error of the differences). In the
first panel, we report the differences across AC-specific characteristics, our preferred unit of analysis.
For our main outcome variable, luminosity, we find that while there were significant differences be-
tween the rump and new state before breakup in the full sample, these differences disappear in the
restricted border sample. A similar pattern holds for the number of conflict occurrences. One variable
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that remains significant even within our restricted border-sample is the constituencies’ mineral en-
dowments. However, we should expect a-priori such a difference and is the basis of our empirical ex-
ploration that links secession to natural resources distribution. However to account for this difference,
we use constituency fixed effects in our empirical strategy to difference out this time-invariant en-
dowment. Additionally, we check the robustness of our results to differential mineral-specific trends
(for e.g., price effects) and show that our results are not affected by this (in Section 5.3). In sum, our
difference-in-difference strategy does control for fixed pre-breakup differences such as mineral en-
dowment – this is less of a threat to identification than time varying differences reported below.
We also focus on district-level characteristics, and use information from the 2001 socio-economic
census to examine two key characteristics, education and caste composition, that could influence
outcomes. The table shows that for both variables, proportion of literates and proportion of back-
ward caste population, the restricted sample differences between the rump and new state are small,
and much lower compared to the full sample. We do find a small statistical difference in the percent-
age of backward caste population in the restricted sample but show later (in Section 5.3) that the trend
differential is not statistically significant, as required by the common trends assumption of our iden-
tification strategy. We also find no significant difference in the average size of districts across borders,
within the restricted sample. Another possible source of bias is the extent of fractionalisation based
on linguistic differences across borders. Since the breakup was partly motivated by linguistic differ-
ences, it is possible that the areas in the new states were linguistically more fragmented which could
indirectly impact economic outcomes (Alesina et al. 2003). Using information from two rounds of
the Language Atlas of India, we construct measures of linguistic fractionalisation based on Alesina
et al. (2003), and find that the measure is stable and statistically not different between the rump and
new-state bordering districts.
Next, we use information from the IHDS on income, consumption expenditures, measures of
health (proxied by infant mortality) and public goods access (proxied by the distance to piped water),
to see if these variables were different across border areas before breakup (year 1992 of the IHDS sur-
vey). We conclude that they are not, in the restricted border sample. Finally, we examine firm-specific
covariate differentials, combining data on all establishments from the Economic Census (year 1998)
and supplementing it with information on a sample of firms from the Annual Survey of Industries
(year 2001). Significant differences in employment or wage patterns could represent a threat to our
identification as they could shift the distribution of economic outcomes post-secession. However, as
Table 2 shows, we find that while significant differences exist in the full-sample, the restricted border
sample means match well across all covariates, leaving small and statistically insignificant difference
across borders.
5.2 RDD ESTIMATES
We begin with the overall effect of state breakup on the difference in luminosity in Table 3, before mov-
ing on to our main results on how they vary with state-level natural resource abundance. The variable
Post captures the trend across states post breakup while ‘Post×New State’ captures the difference be-
tween the new and rump states on average, post breakup. The first two columns of the table report
the OLS estimate of breakup for the entire sample of ACs across all six states, reporting effects with-
out and with border segment fixed effects. The naive OLS specifications suggest that while all states
experience trend increase in luminosity, on average new states did better than the rump states.
There may be other unobservables linked to state borders that might bias the OLS estimates. To
address these concerns, we present RDD estimates in columns 3-5 of the table. We choose three band-
widths with distance thresholds of 150km, 200km and 250km throughout our analysis. We choose
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Tests
FULL SAMPLE RESTRICTED BORDER SAMPLE
Mean (SD) Rump vs. New
State Baseline
Difference
Mean (SD) Rump vs New
State Baseline
Difference
Assembly Constituency Covariates; N=10,116(F), 5985(R)
Log Luminosity 6.589 0.730*** 6.164 −0.00493
(2.260) (0.0616) (2.582) (0.0805)
Mineral Quality 0.006 −0.0210*** 0.009 −0.0214***
(0.0503) (0.00120) (0.0641) (0.00173)
# Conflict Occurrences 0.353 −0.00924*** 0.417 0.00427
(2.613) (0.00282) (2.091) (0.00391)
District Covariates; N=199(F), 38(R)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (1992) 0.208 −0.153*** 0.278 −0.0266
(0.186) (0.0291) (0.185) (0.0607)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (2002) 0.209 −0.143*** 0.278 −0.0257
(0.195) (0.0310) (0.181) (0.0595)
Area (in KMs) 4590.8 −1463.8*** 4776.0 −365.0
(2844.4) (464.4) (2914.4) (956.7)
Proportion Literate 0.465 −0.0510*** 0.438 −0.0451
(0.103) (0.0171) (0.102) (0.0328)
Proportion SC/ST 0.277 −0.120*** 0.287 −0.0768*
(0.146) (0.0230) (0.143) (0.0451)
Household Covariates; N=2454(F), 520(R)
Log Income 8.745 0.0752** 8.685 0.0244
(1.180) (0.0338) (1.082) (0.0621)
Log Food Expenditure 5.666 0.003 5.479 0.033
(1.198) (0.0183) (0.493) (1.110)
Distance to Piped Water 9.293 −0.778 6.230 0.775
(36.82) (2.059) (29.61) (3.115)
Caste Category 2.556 −0.331*** 2.711 0.164
(1.028) (0.0463) (1.146) (0.106)
Firm Covariates; N=6,610,225(F), 1,172,856(R)
# Workers 3.580 −0.625*** 3.574 −0.036
(49.213) (0.050) (35.624) (0.068)
% Mining Workers in District 0.888 −1.440*** 1.173 0.280
(3.703) (0.610) (3.187) (1.047)
Wages & Salaries Paid‡ 14.28 −15.96*** 10.35 −0.632
(172.85) (5.533) (92.85) (5.815)
Consumption of Electricity & Water‡ 20.46 −20.42*** 17.01 16.14
(214.9) (6.972) (189.9) (12.15)
The table reports results the mean (in parentheses standard deviation) of geographic, household and firm-
level variables and their differences between the rump and old states (in parenthesis the standard error of the
differences). The sample size for each panel are indicated for both the full sample (F) and restricted border
sample (R). ‡ variables are obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries for the year 2000; the sample size
for these variables is 5057(F) and 999(R). * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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these thresholds based on our calculations of the optimal bandwidth (Imbens and Kalyanaraman
2011). Our calculations indicate an average optimal bandwidth of 181.36, across all post-breakup
years. Its year-wise value ranges from 165.04 to 204.32, all values lying well within our chosen band-
width span. The RDD estimates suggest the same pattern of results as the OLS, albeit with a much
smaller positive growth effect for the new state. We find that the new states did better than the rump
states, with a differential in luminosity of 35 percent. Note that the last four columns include border-
segment fixed effects allowing the absorption of any unobserved characteristics that are similar across
shared boundary segments (Black 1999).
The above results hide a considerable degree of heterogeneity across ACs within states. Table 4
shows how local post-breakup effects are shaped by local natural resources. While ACs with a high
concentration of deposits do relatively better across all states, they do worse in comparative terms if
they are in the new states, post breakup. So, while natural resource rich ACs do better than natural
resource poor ACs on average following the break-up, and ACs in new states do better on average
relative to ACs in rump states, natural resource rich ACs do comparatively worse in the new states.
Since the identification strategy we employ isolates the effects of state breakup from the effects of other
possible concurrent factors, these results show that these effects come from an interaction between
state breakup and natural resource endowments at the AC level, with the interaction effect operating
differently in the new states and the rump states.
Analogous patterns are in evidence if we focus on outcomes other than luminosity for a sample
of households located in districts that lie along the border of the old and new state (Table 5).37 On
the whole, we find positive effects of breakup on all household level outcomes but negative effects for
those ACs in mineral rich ACs of new states, mirroring the results in Table 3: households in mineral-
rich ACs of new states saw a decrease in income and food expenditure and, at the same time, an in-
crease in infant mortality relative to their peer mineral-poor ACs and other ACs in the rump states.
If we next look at how breakup affects outcomes separately in each of the new states, employing
a specification where the single New State indicator is replaced by state-specific indicators (Table 6),
a mixed picture takes shape. Effects in one new state (Uttarakhand) are better than that its rump, Ut-
tar Pradesh, but worse for Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh relative to their rumps, and these differences
are strongly significant. These stark differences are matched by an equally stark variation in how the
natural resource rich (NRR) regions were distributed between the rump state and the new state post
break up (Table 1, column 2). Note that the OLS coefficient estimates for Jharkhand are negative when
border-segment fixed effects are included in column 2; clearly, even controlling for shared unobserv-
ables within border segments confirms this pattern. We emphasise this point since OLS estimates give
us an average across the state and the positive coefficient in column 1 might be thought to be com-
ing from an average positive effect in the interior of the state. The inclusion of border segment fixed
effects that overturn this pattern suggests that this is not so.
Table 7 disaggregates our mineral interaction results by state pair.38 In the case of the Bihar/Chhat-
tisgarh state pair, we find that the NRR constituencies in the new state of Jharkhand had comparatively
worse outcomes post-secession. This differential effects of secession on NRR vs. NRP ACs is statisti-
cally insignificant for the Madya Pradesh/ Chhattisgarh state pair.
37We use two rounds of data on the same household, utilising information from the 1992 (pre breakup) and 2005 (post
breakup) surveys to form a household level balanced panel.
38We exclude the state pair Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand as the state of Uttarakhand as very few NRR constituencies in
the border areas (even at a distance bandwidth of 250 km) and the the interaction of interest (Post×New State×Mineral) is
not well identified.
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Table 3: RDD Estimates of State Breakup on Log Light Intensity
OLS RDD
BW 150 BW 200 BW 250
Post ×New State 0.824∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.102) (0.168) (0.150) (0.143)
Post 0.944∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗ 2.148∗∗∗ 2.172∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.183) (0.194) (0.191) (0.187)
Border segment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,232 20,232 9,720 11,970 13,608
R 2 0.123 0.153 0.186 0.188 0.182
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC. The specification includes,
AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment fixed effects (in column 2-5) border segment interacted with the
Post indicator and controls for distance to the border by treatment status. BW refers to the area bandwidth, used
for selecting ACs on either side of the border for the analysis. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001
onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created state. Standard errors, clustered at the AC level, are reported
in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Table 4: RDD Estimates of State Breakup on Log Light Intensity: Mineral Areas
OLS RDD
BW 150 BW 200 BW 250
Post ×New State 0.838∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.104) (0.168) (0.152) (0.146)
Post 0.944∗∗∗ 2.013∗∗∗ 2.037∗∗∗ 2.140∗∗∗ 2.168∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.184) (0.194) (0.191) (0.187)
Post ×Mineral −0.246 0.814 1.626∗∗ 1.599∗ 0.968
(0.418) (0.545) (0.773) (0.844) (0.631)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −0.388 −1.679∗∗ −2.758∗∗∗ −2.313∗∗ −1.739∗∗
(0.735) (0.802) (0.951) (1.001) (0.842)
Border segment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,232 20,232 9,720 11,970 13,608
R 2 0.123 0.154 0.187 0.188 0.183
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC. The specification in-
cludes, AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and controls for dis-
tance to the border by treatment status. BW refers to the area bandwidth, used for selecting ACs on either side of
the border for the analysis. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New State is an indicator
for the newly created state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each AC. Standard errors, clustered
at the AC level, are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 5: Effect of Breakup on Household-level Outcomes
Log Income Infant Mortality Log Food Expenditure Water Availability
Post 1.86∗∗∗ −0.01 2.60∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.11) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02)
Post ×New State 0.42∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.03 0.03
(0.13) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
Post ×Mineral 1.74∗∗ −0.45∗ 1.25∗∗∗ −0.13
(0.79) (0.23) (0.47) (0.24)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −2.14∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗ −1.10∗∗ −0.19
(0.77) (0.23) (0.46) (0.22)
Observations 1,035 839 1,039 1,038
R 2 0.82 0.06 0.93 0.13
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on various household indicators obtained from the IHD household survey. The sample is
restricted to households residing within districts around the border of each state (pre and post breakup). The outcome variables are: Log
Income is the total income of a household (in rupees) in logs; Infant Mortality is the infant mortality rate of the household (reported only for
households with children); Log Food Expenditure is the monthly food expenditure of a household (in rupees) in logs; Water Availability is
the binary response to the survey question“Is the availability of drinking water normally adequate?”. The specification includes household
fixed effects and state dummies (all 6 states) interacted with the post-breakup indicator. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001
onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created state. Standard errors, clustered at the household level, are reported in parentheses.
* indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 6: RDD Estimates of State Breakup on Log Light Intensity: Heterogeneity
OLS RDD
BW 150 BW 200 BW 250
Post × Jharkhand (new state) 0.421∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ −0.855∗∗∗ −0.639∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.124) (0.237) (0.192) (0.180)
Post × Chhattisgarh (new state) 0.477∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ −0.324 0.175 0.305∗
(0.050) (0.052) (0.284) (0.203) (0.169)
Post ×Uttarakhand (new state) 1.746∗∗∗ 1.915∗∗∗ 1.444∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗ 1.805∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.240) (0.202) (0.217) (0.220)
Post 0.944∗∗∗ 2.119∗∗∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 2.282∗∗∗ 2.287∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.175) (0.187) (0.183) (0.179)
Border segment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,232 20,232 9,720 11,970 13,608
R 2 0.136 0.172 0.210 0.210 0.205
The table reports the heterogeneous effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC. The specification includes AC fixed
effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and controls for distance to the border by treatment
status. BW refers to the area bandwidth, used for selecting ACs on either side of the border for the analysis. Post refers to the years
after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created state. Standard errors, clustered at the AC
level, are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 7: RDD Estimates by State
Bihar and Jharkhand (Large∆q )
OLS RDD
BW 150 BW 200 BW 250
Post ×New State −0.356∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗ −0.093 0.028 −0.059
(0.126) (0.131) (0.286) (0.245) (0.228)
Post 2.855∗∗∗ 3.251∗∗∗ 2.735∗∗∗ 2.801∗∗∗ 2.879∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.250) (0.276) (0.259) (0.249)
Post ×Mineral 22.020∗∗ 10.490 18.721∗∗ 19.932∗∗∗ 18.747∗∗
(10.125) (9.733) (8.240) (7.606) (7.394)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −22.040∗∗ −10.458 −18.649∗∗ −19.696∗∗ −18.568∗∗
(10.151) (9.802) (8.294) (7.670) (7.467)
Border segment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,832 5,832 4,284 5,238 5,688
R 2 0.238 0.244 0.243 0.255 0.254
Madhya-Pradesh and Chhattisgarh (Small∆q )
OLS RDD
BW 150 BW 200 BW 250
Post ×New State 0.821∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.053) (0.234) (0.192) (0.160)
Post 0.220∗∗∗ 0.262 0.582∗∗ 0.617∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.175) (0.293) (0.241) (0.212)
Post ×Mineral 0.756∗∗ 0.704∗ 0.589 0.422 0.362
(0.342) (0.402) (0.660) (0.551) (0.386)
Post ×New State ×Mineral 0.141 −0.067 −0.886 0.269 0.312
(1.032) (1.019) (1.136) (1.091) (1.013)
Border segment FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,886 5,886 2,178 2,772 3,096
R 2 0.264 0.267 0.259 0.292 0.292
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC. The specification includes,
AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and controls for distance to the
border by treatment status. BW refers to the area bandwidth, used for selecting ACs on either side of the border for the
analysis. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created
state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each AC. Standard errors, clustered at the AC level, are reported
in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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5.3 VALIDITY OF CONDITIONAL COMMON TRENDS ASSUMPTION AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
This section discusses the conditional common trends assumption underlying our RDD difference-
in-difference empirical strategy and presents further robustness checks.
If the conditional common trends assumption holds, we should expect that areas close to the bor-
der would display similar trends before the secession, especially when comparing mineral-rich and
mineral-poor areas. To account for potential differences in human geography, we first use data from
the census to examine whether there are significant differences in the concentration of scheduled
tribes and castes and in literacy rates across border areas, as well as the previously discussed effect on
electricity tariffs. Table 8 summarises the details of this exercise, comparing differences across bound-
aries. While there are trend increases in the concentration of scheduled tribes post 2000, we do not
find a significant difference across states.39
We then carry out two placebo-style checks on conditional common trends (Table 9) to verify that
the effects we measure can be attributed to the secession episodes we observe. First, we artificially
move back the date of secession to 1996, four years before the actual breakup occurred. Columns
1-3 present results from this exercise; we find throughout that the Post ×New State effect as well as
the Post ×New State ×Mineral is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the positive discontinuity
in outcomes for new states only started revealing itself after the states were formally split in 2000. In
the second instance, we examine the effect of a false, 2001 breakup on luminosity in the southern
states of Andhra Pradesh (AP) which is resource-rich relative to the new state of Telangana and where
breakup occurred only in 2014. We take this as a placebo and ask whether the results here mimic those
of the other three states if we pick the date of breakup as 2001. A potential concern is that the effect of
concentrated resource endowments might have occurred with or without breakup if, for instance, an
increase in returns from mining or opportunities to extract rents had changed for some reason post
2001. These results, in columns 4-6 of the table, strongly support the notion that breakup matters.
There is, as for our other specifications, a strong positive trend in outcomes post 2001, but there is
no particular effect of the placebo treatment, nor is there any particular effect of local mineral en-
dowments that might independently have been affected post 2001 by a change in prices or rents over
time.40
Next, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to variations in the estimation approach and to the
inclusion of additional controls. To account for spatial correlation in our dependent variable, we apply
a spatial correction (Conley 1999) to our method of inference. Table C1 presents our main results with
spatially adjusted standard errors and shows that our results are robust to the presence of arbitrary
spatial correlation. We also examine the role of conflict, primarily from Marxist (Naxalite) rebellions
and differential mineral price trend effects, in driving the state secession results. Mineral rich areas
are also areas with heightened violence and conflict, and so the mineral resource effects we find may
merely reflect developments in active conflicts in these states around the same time when state bor-
ders were redrawn. Additionally it could be that mineral prices (typically endogenous) trended differ-
ently after the state-breakup, affecting outcomes in new vs. old states. To investigate this, we included
a measure of conflict, as proxied by the number of Maoist rebels-related incidents, and dummies for
mineral type interacted with year in all specifications. The mineral type by year fixed effects allow us
39Trend increases can be potentially explained by the fact that, since the border was drawn, re-settlements over time have
affected the relative strength of settlements and there has been spillovers in settlements across borders. Census data since
1881 have shown a gradual decline of tribal populations in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. The main reason for this pattern
are the low birth rates and high mortality rates among the tribes as well as the loss of traditional land.
40This result holds even when pooling the “placebo” sample with the original six states sample and testing for the effect
of new state interacted with placebo state pair. The coefficient on this interaction is statistically insignificant.
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Table 8: Electricity Price, Demographics and State Breakup
State Electricity Tariff Demographic Shifts
Pr. Literate Pr. SC/ST
Post ×New State −9.91 −10.40 −0.07 0.005
(9.44) ( 8.58) (0.04) (0.04)
Post 325.39*** 325.64*** −0.08*** 0.14***
(15.50) (14.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Year FE Yes Yes NA NA
District/State FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 122 122 63 63
R2 0.95 0.97 0.58 0.67
This table reports results for the effect of breakup on electricity tariff (column 1 & 2) and demographics (column
3 & 4). Data on electricity tariff is provided at an annual level for each state. Census data on demographics is
available for two periods, 1991 and 2001, at the district level. The analysis in column 3 & 4 is restricted to districts
around the border of each state (after breakup). Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards:
New State is an indicator for the newly created state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each AC.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Table 9: RDD Estimates of Placebo Breakup on Log Light Intensity
Placebo Breakup 1996 Placebo Breakup AP
BW 150 BW 200 BW 250 BW 150 BW 200 BW 250
Post ×New State −0.140 0.134 0.131 0.021 0.038 0.068
(0.200) (0.191) (0.175) (0.118) (0.106) (0.101)
Post 2.524∗∗∗ 2.610∗∗∗ 2.684∗∗∗ 1.672∗∗∗ 1.633∗∗∗ 1.595∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.298) (0.292) (0.217) (0.193) (0.176)
Post ×Mineral 0.409 0.679 0.026 −7.319 −1.346 3.162
(1.149) (1.107) (0.849) (10.292) (9.359) (8.828)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −0.912 −1.146 −0.628 0.075 1.694 −2.677
(1.363) (1.292) (1.107) (15.336) (9.322) (8.802)
Observations 4,320 5,320 6,048 4,662 5,364 6,012
R 2 0.183 0.196 0.197 0.221 0.230 0.215
The table reports results for placebo effects. We investigate: (i) in columns 1-3, the effect of a placebo state breakup
on luminosity in the pre breakup year of 1996 (four years before the actual breakup occurred); and (ii) in columns
4-6, the effect of a 2001 placebo-breakup on luminosity in the states of Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Telangana (whose
breakup occurred only in 2014). The dependent variable for all specifications is the log of total luminosity in each AC.
All specifications include, AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and
controls for distance to the border by treatment status. BW refers to the area bandwidth, used for selecting ACs on
either side of the border for the analysis. Post refers to the years after breakup; New State is an indicator for the newly
created state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each AC. Standard errors, clustered at the AC level, are
reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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to flexibly control for differential price trends specific to an AC and its mineral deposit without hav-
ing to include (a potentially endogenous) mineral price variable. Table C2 shows that our results are
not affected by the inclusion of conflict or mineral-price trends; furthermore, while the coefficient on
the conflict variable is negative throughout, it is mostly statistically insignificant. Column 3 presents
results on the effect of mineral resources post breakup on economic activity, after controlling for con-
flict and mineral-price trends. Here again, we find that our results are robust to controlling for the
incidence of conflict and differential mineral prices post-breakup. Changes in luminosity could also
be driven by changes in the price of electricity. To examine this, we use available data on electricity
prices by state and year (an unbalanced panel) and examine their evolution across states. Results of
panel regressions suggests that, while there were trend increases in prices across states, there are no
significant differences between new and old states. Such concerns should also be mitigated by the fact
that we use regression discontinuity techniques and compare areas around state boundaries.41
6 THE LINK BETWEEN NATURAL RESOURCES AND POLITICS
The theoretical predictions we derived in Section 3 say that secession can affect economic perfor-
mance through a change in the balance of power between NRR constituencies and NRP constituencies
in the state legislatures: as NRP constituencies act as a deterrent to the rent extraction activities gener-
ating excessive negative spillovers from the NRR constituencies, a reduction in their relative political
weight reduces political accountability at state level and lowers economic performance (Proposition
2). The patterns in evidence in Table 6 are consonant with this prediction: where secession produced
a very high density of natural resources – the case of Jharkhand, with almost two ACs out of three ACs
being resource rich – we see worse outcomes at the state level.
Another prediction from the theory that is more narrowly focused but is more distinctively linked
to the mechanism we model is that, when the adverse effect of increased resource endowments dom-
inates other effects, it should bring about a fall in the comparative performance of NRR ACs relative to
that of NRP ACs, an outcome that is more likely the larger is the proportion of NRR ACs post secession
(Proposition 3). In line with this, we find that in the state of Jharkhand (the state that ended up with
the highest proportion of NRR ACs amongst all new states and that also ended up doing worse over-
all), NRR constituencies had comparatively worse outcomes post-secession. On the other hand, this
differential effect of secession on NRR vs. NRP ACs is statistically insignificant when examining the
patterns for Chhattisgarh, where the proportion of NRR ACs increased but remained comparatively
low.
The picture that emerges from the above results thus aligns with the theoretical predictions of Sec-
tion 3, whereby a high-enough proportion of NRR ACs triggers a resource curse via a political channel.
However, this interpretation of the empirical results hinges on observations for three state-pairs, rais-
ing doubts as to whether the patterns we observe could be the result of some other cause that happens
to be aligned with the changes in the q ’s that occurred with secession. To address this concern, we
present further suggestive evidence that a political channel is at work.
41Breakup could have also changed how electricity supply in border regions may be strategically rationed for political
gain (Baskaran et al. 2015). To address this concern, we re-ran the specification underlying the results of Table 5, but now
using as dependent variable a survey-based measure of household access to electricity supply (Chakravorty et al. 2014): 0
if the household was not connected, 1 if it experienced power outages, 2 if the power supply was continuous. Both mineral
interaction terms (Post×Mineral and Post×New State×Mineral) are statistically insignificant; i.e. households in NRR ACs
on either side of the border did not experience differential changes in their access to electricity supply post-breakup.
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Table 10: Criminal Politicians and the Distribution of Natural Resources
All-India 6 States Jharkhand
Prop. Criminal MLA Criminal MLA Election Malpractice
All ACs Mineral vs. Rest Binary Intensity
Min. Density (q ) 0.32* 4.30*** 2.787**
(0.19) (0.72) (1.105)
Mineral 0.284*** 6.268***
(0.074) (2.399)
Observations 29 27 179 626 705
R 2 0.08 0.80 0.02 0.18 0.21
This table reports the correlation between criminal politician, election malpractice and its mineral resource endowment. The unit of
observation in column 2 is a sate; in column 4 it is a parliamentary constituency while in column 5-6 it is a household. The dependent
variables in column 2 is the proportion of criminal MLAs in the state assembly as of 2011 (reported by Lokniti); in column 3 it is the
ratio of criminal MLAs in mineral vs non mineral areas between 2004-2012 in 16 states; in column 4 it is an indicator variable for if the
winning candidate of the constituency (MP) has a criminal record; in column 5 it is an indicator for whether a household witnessed any
electoral malpractice/irregularities; in column 5 it is an ordered indicator for the extent to which a household witnessed any electoral
malpractice or election irregularities, ranging from 0 (no malpractice) to 3 (several malpractices). q is the proportion of mineral ACs
within, a state (columns 2-3) and parliamentary constituency (column 4). Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each
AC. The specification in column 2 uses state-level observations for the year 2011 while in column 3 observations are pooled by state
and year (depending on the election year for the state). Columns 4-5 report logit and ordered logit specifications (reporting marginal
effects and odds-ratio respectively), conditioning on household characteristics (income, assets, caste, rural vs. urban location) and
district dummies. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Natural Resource Density and Criminal Politicians
First, in Table 10 we document a positive association between state-level natural resource density (the
q s) and weak governance (proxied by the proportion of legislators with a criminal conviction both
across and within states). Columns 1 and 2 show that the proportion of criminal MLAs in the state
legislative assembly, as well as in terms of the ratio between NRR and NRP constituencies within a
state, is higher in states with a high level of q (proportion of NRR constituencies). Further, focusing
only on the six states in our analysis we find in column 3, in a sample of 179 Parliamentary Constituen-
cies (electing federal level MPs), the likelihood of a politician with a criminal record being elected is
increasing in the density of mines in that constituency. Chemin (2012) offers evidence for the link be-
tween criminal politicians and weak governance: he demonstrates that criminal politicians decrease
the welfare of constituents and increase crime and corruption. In addition, a key assumption of the
theory is that vote-buying and electoral fraud is higher in resource-rich areas. This is supported by
the evidence in columns 4-5 of Table 10, that vote buying and electoral fraud takes place relatively
more in the mineral rich areas. We use survey responses from the State Election Survey for Jharkhand
in 2005 to do so, on questions to individual voters about perceptions of voting malpractices. Using a
logit/ordered-logit specification of perceived voting malpractice within a district against the number
of mines within that district gives a coefficient of 0.28 that is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that
electoral malpractices are positively related to natural resource endowments.
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Natural Resource Density, Elections and Mining Intensity
Another perspective on the political channel is how the relative difference in outcomes for NRR ACs vs
NRP is affected by electoral competition. If a political channel is at work, this gap would vary over the
electoral cycle; and, if secession changes the political weight of NRR ACs as our theory says, we would
expect secession to change the way the gap is affected by the election cycle. The first two columns of
Table 11 show that this is the case: the coefficient we reported refers to the triple interaction of seces-
sion, mineral resource abundance at the AC level and election year (a triple difference-in-difference
effect). For Jharkand, we find a large and significant effect, which again points to the effects of seces-
sion operating through a political channel that flows through NRR ACs.
The third column of Table 11 focuses on how secession affects the gap between NRR ACs that are
swing ACs, in the sense that the fraction of voters who firmly support either party (partisan voters) is
small, and those where voters firmly support one party. Although our stylised theoretical discussion
has made no distinction between ACs along these lines, we might expect votes to be comparatively
more valuable in swing ACs, and so a higher “price” (x ) to be paid for votes in those ACs.42 The negative
and significant triple-interaction coefficient we see indicates that the negative effects of breakup in
NRR ACs for states which experience an increase in q post breakup are exacerbated when these ACs are
swing ACs. The fourth column of the table focuses instead on “politically aligned” NRR ACs where the
locally elected political belongs to the incumbent party at state level. We might expect that, when the
local politician is aligned with the ruling party, a vote-for-favours transaction might be easier, which
should exacerbate the adverse effects of secession in NRR ACs. The results of this triple interaction are
in line with this.
The theory also implies that mining-related activity should increase sharply in the new states that
see a large share of NRR areas post secession, because of more mining licenses being granted or be-
cause of increased opportunities for rent-seeking. Using data from the census of all firm establish-
ments in India between 1998 and 2005, we construct a measure of employment density in the mining
sector by taking the ratio of employment in the mining sector to the total employment of all sectors in
a particular district. Consistently with the prediction of an effect of secession on the relative intensity
of mining and non-mining activities, we find that the proportion of individuals employed in mining
increases by 0.14% post-secession in the NRR constituencies of the new states (Table 12).
Ruling Out Alternative Explanations
Our stylised model gives a precise characterisation of the effects of natural resource density that are
mediated by political competition; but the model’s predictions can be taken as being about the eco-
nomic effects of governance as broadly defined. In practice the way in which the quality of governance
is affected by a change in natural resource density in a particular case may materialise in ways other
than explicit granting of favours – e.g., what we might observe in a particular case, as a systematic re-
sponse to a higher density of NRR ACs, is a Chief Minister devoting insufficient attention to the man-
agement of natural resources. What we emphasise in our theory is the primacy of a political channel
42To see this, consider an asymmetric variation of our symmetric setup, in which there are two NRR constituencies, 1 and
2, both having the same fraction, v , of votes for sale, but featuring electorates with different median ideologies. If 100% of
the voters in AC 1 always support the incumbent irrespectively of whether or not votes are bought, then the votes that are
for sale in AC 1 have no value (or equivalently, they can be had for free), and therefore, an asymmetric equilibrium with
constituency-specific “prices” x1 and x2 will always feature x1 = 0. On the other hand, if 100% of the voters in AC 1 always
support the challenger, then it may be prohibitively costly for the local seller to procure votes (i.e. there would be no votes for
sale in that AC), and so again we would have x1 = 0. Thus, if resource rich ACs are aligned or swing ACs we expect outcomes
to be worse post breakup, relative to non-aligned or non-swing ACs.
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Table 11: Interactions with Political Indicators
Dependent variable: log light intensity
Electoral Cycle Election Factors
Bihar-
Jharkhand
Madhya
Pradesh-
Chhattisgarh
Swing AC Political Alignment
Post ×New State ×Mineral × Election Year 35.301∗∗∗ −0.066
(7.320) (0.980)
Post ×New State ×Mineral × Swing −4.278**
(2.033)
Post ×New State ×Mineral × Alignment −1.973*
(1.183)
Observations 5,688 3,096 11,034 9,195
R 2 0.259 0.308 0.183 0.136
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of light intensity within each AC, for a distance bandwidth of 250-
200 km. The specification includes AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and
controls for distance to the border by treatment status. All specifications also control for all possible interaction combinations,
not reported, but which are mostly insignificant. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New State is an
indicator for the newly created state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each AC; Elec Year refers to an indicator for
time t and t +1 where t is the identified election year; Swing refers to whether the margin of victory in the pre-breakup election
year for less than 2%; Alignment is a (time-varying) binary indicator for whether the constituency’s winning candidate belongs
to the (leading) ruling party of the state. The specification in Column 5, uses only observations prior to delimitation in 2008.
Standard errors clustered at the AC level are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 12: Mining Employment
% Mining Workers
Post ×New State 0.803
(0.689)
Post −0.367
(0.599)
Post ×Mineral −0.097∗
(0.051)
Post ×New State ×Mineral 0.135∗∗
(0.060)
Observations 74
R 2 0.128
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on mining employment density in each district. % Min-
ing Workers is the proportion of workers employed in the mining sector relative to the total employment
in a district. The specification includes, AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with
the Post indicator and controls for distance to the border by treatment status. Post refers to the years after
breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created state; Mineral refers to the
total quality of mines within each AC. Standard errors, clustered at the AC level, are reported in parentheses.
* indicates significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
mediating some of the effects of natural resource density that we observe.43
There are two main types of potentially competing explanations, not involving a link between pol-
itics and natural resources, that we must consider for the effects we see. First, a large literature has
looked at terms-of-trade effects associated with natural resource abundance (the “Dutch Disease”);
as the outcomes we consider are for regions that are part of a single economy where factors of pro-
duction can move freely across state borders, this type of explanation does not seem relevant for the
context we are studying.44 Second, it is possible that secession could bring about institutional or po-
litical changes that have nothing to do with natural resources; but, as Rodrik et al. (2004) argue, in-
stitutions are deep-seated, and so we could not expect them to have changed due to secession and
in such a short period. Changes in political outcomes coming from a change in the composition of
the electorate in the new states may well explain different outcomes overall, but cannot explain the
differential effect for NRR and NRP areas and how it relates to natural resource density.
Still, the effects that we observe to be associated with a large increase in natural resource density
could be due to state-level idiosyncratic factors that have nothing to do with the political channel we
describe; e.g. a Chief Minister may be a poor manager of natural resources independently of the mech-
43The literature has offered alternative characterisations of a politically-mediated natural resource curse, principal
amongst them is one that focuses on windfall revenues leading to lower accountability and consequently higher moral haz-
ard, worse selection and a higher likelihood of corrupt incumbents staying in power (Brollo et al. 2013). In our setting, there
are no windfall revenues to states – the windfall gain is just the higher share of mineral rich areas. Also, this explanation does
not account for the differences between natural resource rich and poor areas at the local level.
44A related explanation is crowding out of other sectors by natural resources (e.g. Perroni and Proto 2010, plus others),
but there is no reason to expect that this crowding out would be affected by secession – unless the effect operates through a
change in the governance of natural resources.
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Table 13: Ruling Out Other Determinants Correlated with Secession
Lights
BW 150 BW 150 BW 150
Post ×New State 0.381∗∗ -0.123 −0.095
(0.168) (0.123) (0.160)
Post 2.037∗∗∗ −0.594∗∗∗ −0.620∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.085) (0.084)
Post ×Mineral 1.626∗∗ 1.014∗ 1.166∗∗
(0.773) (0.543) (0.565)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −2.758∗∗∗ −1.071∗ −1.232∗
(0.951) (0.647) (0.681)
Additional FEs – State×Year State×Election Year
Observations 9,720 9,720 9,720
R 2 0.187 0.015 0.015
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC (columns 2-4)
in each district (column 5). The specification includes, AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment
interacted with the Post indicator and controls for distance to the border by treatment status. BW refers to
the area bandwidth, used for selecting ACs on either side of the border for the analysis. Post refers to the
years after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created state; Mineral
refers to the total quality of mines within each AC. Standard errors, clustered at the AC level, are reported
in parentheses. Standard errors in columns 3-4 are additionally adjusted for auto-correlation. * indicates
significance at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
anism we describe. Although we cannot conclusively exclude that other factors may play a role, we
can amend our empirical specification to at least exclude those idiosyncratic state-level shocks that
are correlated with secession. Table 13 shows results for a specification that additionally conditions
on state-by-year effects (and state-by-election year); these controls accommodate any idiosyncratic
state-level shocks (such as a poor head of state or bad luck) that may be correlated with secession,
leaving only the secession-related structural break as the source of variation used to identify the ef-
fects. The inclusion of state-year effects reduces the effect of being in mineral-rich ACs in a new state,
but this effect remains statistically significant and negative.
Finally, a potential issue in the interpretation of the empirical results is the role of transfers from
the centre to the states upon breakup, which might have affected the evolution of outcomes over time.
However, as Figure 5 indicates, the pattern of transfers favours the old rump states, particularly Uttar
Pradesh.45 Although this picture cannot explain the relative success of Uttarakhand, it might explain
the relatively poor performance of the other two new states. But, as shown in Table 13, controlling for
state-specific time trends does not change the heterogeneity patterns we see, which emanates at the
more local level of the assembly constituencies.
45Note that the transfers measured here include all taxes, grants and loans to the state from the Centre.
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Figure 5: Trends in Devolution and Transfer of Resources to New and Old States
The figure shows the amount (in INR crores) of money transfered from the center to
the new and old states between 1980-2010. Source: OpenBudgetIndia
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we exploit the breakup of three of the largest states in India, comprising areas with some
of the largest concentration of mineral resources in the country, to examine how changes in the po-
litical balance between natural resource related interests and other interests affects outcomes at the
local level. Our theoretical framework suggests that within a region where political opponents com-
pete with each other for votes, outcomes vary with the level of natural resource endowments: very
high endowments are likely to lead to perverse outcomes. The secession episode that occurred within
India allows us to examine this question using longitudinal evidence and in the context of a single
larger economy.
While the peculiarities of the Indian institutional context and the small number of secession cases
that we can compare across, as well as our regression discontinuity design, limit to some extent the
generalisability of our empirical results, the main predictions of the theory are consonant with the
patterns we find in the data. In particular, when new states inherit a large share of natural resources,
we see NRR areas in such states doing worse relative to comparable NRR areas in rump states and, in
comparative terms, doing worse than NRP areas of the same state. According to the theory presented
in Section 3, this is a symptom of a natural-resource curse that is mediated through a political channel.
While we cannot decisively rule out alternative explanations, a political channel seems the simplest
and most intuitive way to understand the evidence.
The question of how to design institutions that can harness the positive effects of natural resources
is an important one for economic development, as poorer countries rely comparatively more on nat-
ural capital (van der Ploeg 2011). Our results suggest that the adverse effects of patronage politics
could be mitigated by redrawing constituency borders so as to reduce the weight of NRR areas within
individual ACs and so make it more difficult to buy a large fraction of the total votes – although it has
been shown that vote trading is itself a function of the level of development (Aidt and Jensen 2017).
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Second, our analysis suggests that outcomes might improve if the response to demands for secession
were met by higher fiscal redistribution towards the areas that threaten to secede, rather than by creat-
ing new political entities (although, of course, this may create a moral hazard problem). Indeed, Aidt
and Dutta (2016) shows the importance of the design of fiscal federalism institutions in the face of
different types of externalities between local regions. Finally, changing the current allocation of deci-
sion powers with respect to mineral concessions and royalty rates, as well as the way public revenues
from natural resources are allocated across state and local communities, may be an effective way of
mitigating the curse.46
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A DATA SOURCES
In this section we describe in detail the additional data used for the analysis.
National and State Election Study 2004: The survey is conducted by the CSDS. The survey interviews respon-
dents immediately after polling and enumerates information on the political behaviour, opinion and attitudes
of voters alongside their demographics. The survey uses a dummy ballot box for capturing the respondent’s vot-
ing choice wherein respondents were asked to mark their voting preference on a dummy ballot paper and drop
it in a dummy ballot box. Sampling for the survey is carried out using a multi-stage stratified random sampling
design. The first stage involves stratified sampling of Assembly Constituencies by state proportional to their
size. In the second stage, polling stations are sampled from each of these ACs, again proportional to electorate
size. In the final stage respondents are selected from the Electoral Rolls provided by the Election Commission.
Respondents are sampled by the Systematic Random Sampling (SRS) method, which is based on a fixed inter-
val ratio between two respondents in the polling booth. More information on the sampling and questionnaire
modules of the 2004 NES can be found in Lokniti (2004).
AC and PC Maps: The Assembly Constituency (AC) and the Parliamentary Constituency (PC) map, shape files
were obtained from the Election Commission of India website (http://eci.gov.in/). This data was cleaned and
geo-referenced using projections provided by Sandip Sukhtankar47 and INRM Consultants, New Delhi. Note
that the AC maps for Uttarakhand are only available post delimitation. However, only a small fraction of con-
stituencies are affected by the delimitation procedure in Uttarakhand and are results are robust to dropping
these constituencies. Distances to the border for each AC was calculated by taking the centroid of each AC poly-
gon and measuring its Euclidean distance to the state border line. Finally, we also divide the entire border line
into segments which we include as fixed effects in our specifications.
Data on Conflict: The data on the conflict as measured by Maoist incidents is compiled by Gomes (2015)48 and
comes from four different sources: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) I: 1970-1997 & II: 1998-2007; Rand-MIPT
Terrorism Incident database (1998-present); Worldwide Incidents tracking system (WITS); National Counter
Terrorism Centre (2004-2007); South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP).
47Retrieved from http://www.dartmouth.edu/~sandip/data.html.
48We are very grateful to Joseph Flavian Gomes for sharing his data on district level conflict in India.
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Data on Criminal Politicians: Data on criminal politicians in India for the six states in our analysis is taken
from Fisman et al. (2014), who compile this information from candidate affidavits. These are held on the the
GENESYS Archives of the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the various websites of the the Chief Electoral
Officer in each state. The archives provide scanned candidate affidavits (in the form of pictures or PDFs) for all
candidates. The all India data on criminal MLAs is taken from Prakash et al. (2019) (Table 10, Column 2) and
Lokniti (Table 10, Column 1).
Household Panel Data, IHDS: We use data from two waves (1992 and 2004) of the India Human Development
Survey (IHDS). This is a nationally representative survey of 41,554 households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban
neighbourhoods across India. Data are publicly available through ICPSR. For details on the survey see Desai
et al. (2007).
State Election Results: We use the results of all state elections held in the six states analysed, between the years
of 1992 and 2009. This data is obtained from the Election Commission of India.
Human Demographics: We use data on district-level migration and literacy from the two census waves con-
ducted in 1991 and 2001. This data is available on the census of India website.
Electricity Prices: Data on electricity tariff is compiled at an annual level for each state by India Stat.This data is
sourced from the annual reports on the working of state electricity boards and electricity departments as well
as the Planning Commission reports.
Firm Data: The census data on all firm establishments and employments activity in the mining sectors is ob-
tained from the fourth (year 1998) and fifth (year 2005) round of the Economic Census. We supplement data
on firm level outcomes with information on wages and salaries and electricity consumption from the Annual
Survey of Industries conducted in 2001.
B PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
As only one buyer (the incumbent party, L) can buy votes, the votes for sale have no alternative use, and so if
the buyer has all the bargaining power and can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the vote sellers, it will be able
to buy the votes at a price x = 0. On the other hand, if only the incumbent party, L , can buy votes, but the sellers
have all the bargaining power and operate as a single seller (i.e. they collude), then the take-it-or-leave-it offer
price can be derived as follows.
The overall effect for a NRR constituency from x > 0 is given by (λ+ρq ) x , whereas the effect for a NRP
constituency is given by ρq x . The utility of voters in a NRR constituency from the L party being elected under
shock s is now given byU Li =−(−1/2−i+s )2−(λ+ρq ) x ,49 and a voter i is therefore indifferent between the L and
R parties (i.e. U Li =U
L
i ) iff−(−1/2−i +s )2−(λ+ρq )x =−(1/2−i +s )2. This gives the cutoff ideology conditional
on shock s as iˆ N R R = −(λ+ρq )x/2− s , and in an NRP constituency the cutoff ideology is iˆ N R P = −ρq x/2− s .
The vote share of the L party among the 1 − v voters in q NRR constituencies who do not sell their votes is
then given by iˆ N R R + 1/2 = 1/2− (1/2)(λ+ρq )x/2− s . The loss of votes due to x > 0 in an NRR constituency
is LR = (λ+ρq )x/2. The vote share of the L party among the voters in each of the 1− q NRP constituencies is
given by iˆ P +1/2, and the loss of votes in an NRP constituency due to x > 0 is LP =ρq x/2.
Suppose that party L buys the q v votes at price x in a state. The total vote share conditional on shock
s is given by VL B = q v + q (1 − v ) (1/2− s − LR ) + (1 − q ) (1/2− s − LP ). The L party wins if VL B ≥ 1/2, i.e. iff
q v + (1/2− s ) (1−q v ) +q (1− v ) (−LR )+ (1−q ) (−LP )≥ 1/2, or
q v
2
− q (1− v )λx
2
− (1−q v ) ρq x
2
≥ s (1−q v ). (7)
Using the fact that s is uniformly distributed on [−1/2, 1/2], the probability of winning is
P WL =
1
2
+
1
2(1−q v )
 
q v −q (1− v )λx −ρq x (1−q v )≡Φ(x ). (8)
49Note that we ignore spillovers from other constituencies that are not in the state, as voters do not include those in the
calculation since they cannot affect those spillovers.
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Then, the maximum price the buyer is willing to pay is that for which Φ(x ) = 1/2, which gives x = v /
 
λ (1− v )+
ρ (1− q v ) ≡ x˜ . The seller’s payoff, P WL x = Φ(x ) x , reaches a maximum at x = 2 x˜/(3 q v ), which, for v ≤ 1/2,
is always greater than x˜ . Thus, x˜ is the value of x that maximises the seller’s payoff subject to the constraint
P WL ≥ 1/2.
TWO BUYERS OR MULTIPLE SELLERS
If both the L and the R parties can buy votes from a single seller where the seller makes a simultaneous take it
or leave it offer to the buyers, x˜ remains unchanged. The sequence of actions is as follows. The seller posts a
price. Each buyer can accept or reject the price. If both buyers accept the offer, the votes are sold, at the posted
price, to one of the buyers selected at random. If one buyer accepts while the other buyer rejects, the accepting
buyer gets the votes. If both buyers reject the offer, another offer can subsequently be made according to the
same protocol. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
Allowing for multiple sellers also does not change conclusions, as the following discussion demonstrates.
Suppose that there is a mass, q , of N NRR equal-sized constituencies, each of them having mass q/N ; and
suppose that sellers simultaneously post prices x1, x2, ...xN , and make a take it or leave it offer to the buyer. Each
seller chooses its price given the conjectured prices of the other sellers. If the seller of a single NRR constituency,
j , sells v votes for a price x j , while all other sellers in NRR constituencies post a price x0 (assuming symmetry),
the loss of votes (among the 1− v voters in the NRR districts) to the incumbent in constituency j is (1/2)  λx j +
ρ
 
x j +(N −1)x0q/N . In the Natural Resource Poor (NRP) constituencies, the loss of votes is (1/2)ρ(x j +(N −
1)x0)q/N . Hence the probability of winning is
P WL j =
1
2
+
1
2(1−q v )

q v −q (1− v ) λx j +ρ(x j + (N −1)x0q/N − (1−q ) ρ(x j + (N −1)x0q/N . (9)
The best offer from the perspective of seller j is then that which makes the above expression equal to 1/2 (the
buyer’s reservation value), given the other sellers’ choice, x0. Solving for this optimal x j , as a function of x0,
and then focusing on a symmetric solution with x j = x0, we obtain a value x˜ that is the same as that with full
collusion. The intuition for this result is that each seller, no matter how small, acts as a monopolist for its votes
against the given buyer’s total reservation payoff of 1/2.
SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING
It can be shown that, under sequential bargaining, the equilibrium level of x is decreasing in ρ and increasing
in q . The corresponding equilibrium values of P WL are also decreasing in ρ and increasing in q .
Let U S (x ) =Φ(x ) x and U B (x ) =Φ(x )−1/2, and let  U S (xS ),U B (xS ) denote the offer made by the seller, and 
U S (xB ),U B (xB )

the offer made by the buyer. If the seller is the first mover, an equilibrium corresponds to the
solution of the two equations: U B (xS ) =δU B (xB ) and U S (xB ) =δU S (xS ). This gives
xS = x˜
1+δ
 
1+δ−p1+δ(2+δ−4 q v (1−q v )) /(2v q )
1+δ+δ2
. (10)
This is increasing in q. Thus, when some of the surplus accrues to the buyer (the incumbent party, L), an increase
in the density of natural resources (a higher q ) can make the incumbent’s position more secure (it raises P WL ).
Qualitatively analogous results obtain under Nash bargaining.
ENDOGENOUS q
Suppose than in any AC, j , there is a cost c for delivering v votes to the buyer. ACs are indexed so that the
private net unit value, z ( j ), of the concessions made by the state in relation to natural resources (net of taxes
and any other private costs incurred by the beneficiaries) is increasing in j , with j ∈ [0, 1]. Then the vote seller
will deliver votes from a given AC, j , iff z ( j ) x > c , and will not deliver any votes from that AC otherwise. Since
z ′( j ) > 0, if z (0) x < c and z (1) x > c , there will be a cutoff point j (x ) such that there will be votes for sale only
in ACs j > j , and so q = 1− j (x ). The seller’s take-it-or-leave it offer, x , together with the proportion, q , of ACs
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involved in vote sales is then identified by the two conditions x =
v
λ (1− v ) +ρ (1− v q ) ;
z (1−q ) x − c = 0.
(11)
For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of our discussion we will assume z ( j ) = z0 +α j , but the arguments
can be generalised to any schedule z ( j ) s.t. z ′( j )> 0. The mean level of z is z = z0 +α/2; solving for z0, we can
then express z ( j ) as z ( j ) = z +α ( j − 1/2), where z can be interpreted as reflecting the density (average value)
of natural resources in the state, and α their concentration within the state. Replacing this expression into the
above system of equations and solving for x and q , we obtain
x˜ =
(α−ρ c )v
α(λ+ρ)−α(λ+ρ/2)v −ρ z v ;
q˜ =
(α/2+ z )v − (λ (1− v ) +ρ) c
(α−ρ c )v .
(12)
In an interior solution with q˜ ∈ (0, 1), both x˜ and q˜ are increasing in z and decreasing in α; i.e. an increase in
the density of natural resources leads to more votes-for-favours transactions and more rent grabbing, whereas
an increase in their concentration has the opposite effect.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let z ≡ qA/qB . Since (qA+qB )/2 = qU , this implies qA = 2 qU z/(1+z ), qB = 2 qU /(1+z ). DifferentiatingU N R PA /U N R PB
with respect to z = qA/qB , we obtain
d
 
U N R PA /U
N R P
B

d(qA/qB )
=
(1−γ2) (1+qA/qB )2  (1− v )λ+ρ  (1− v )λ+ (1−2 qU v )ρ
(1− v ) (1+qA/qB ) (1+γqA/qB )λ+  1+ ((1+γ)(1−2 qU v ) +γqA/qB )qA/qB ρ2 . (13)
Since U N R PA and U
N R P
B are both negative, a positive sign means that welfare in A becomes worse relative to
welfare in B . In turn, the sign of (13) is positive if an only if qU < (1− v )λ/(2 v ρ) ≡ q¯U . For v approaching zero
q¯U approaches infinity and for v approaching zero it equals (λ+ρ)/(2ρ), which is greater than unity given that
λ >ρ. We can thus conclude that (13) is positive for any v ∈ (0, 1). Also, since λ >ρ, U N R RA /U N R PA is increasing
in xA , which in turn is increasing in z .
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C ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Table C1: RDD Estimates of Log Light Intensity, with Spatially Adjusted Errors
BW 150 BW 150 BW 150
Post ×New State 0.348*** 0.381***
(0.103) (0.104)
Post × Jharkhand (new state) −0.855***
(0.155)
Post × Chhattisgarh (new state) −0.324**
(0.149)
Post ×Uttarakhand (new state) 1.444***
(0.109)
Post
Post ×Mineral 1.626***
(0.530)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −2.758***
(0.635)
Observations 9,720 9,720 9,720
R 2 0.042 0.070 0.043
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC. All specifica-
tions include AC fixed effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and
controls for distance to the border by treatment status. BW refers to the area bandwidth, used for select-
ing ACs on either side of the border for the analysis. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001
onwards: New State is an indicator for the newly created state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines
within each AC. Spatially adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance
at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table C2: RDD Estimates of Log Light Intensity, Controlling for Conflict
BW 150 BW 150 BW 150
Post ×New State 0.405∗∗ 0.417∗∗
(0.166) (0.167)
Post × Jharkhand (new State) −1.068∗∗∗
(0.236)
Post × Chhattisgarh (new state) −0.533∗
(0.311)
Post ×Uttarakhand (new state) 1.428∗∗∗
(0.208)
Post 1.334∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗
(0.374) (0.356) (0.375)
Post ×Mineral 2.488∗
(1.341)
Post ×New State ×Mineral −4.221∗∗∗
(1.244)
Conflict −0.403 −0.417 −0.406
(0.293) (0.290) (0.293)
Post × Conflict 0.390 0.386 0.394
(0.296) (0.292) (0.295)
Post ×New State × Conflict −0.047 0.050∗ −0.045
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Mineral × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,720 9,720 9,720
R 2 0.222 0.244 0.222
The table reports results for the effect of breakup on the log of total luminosity in each AC.
Effects of breakup for each state-pair are also reported. All specifications include AC fixed
effects, year fixed effects, border segment interacted with the Post indicator and controls for
distance to the border by treatment status. Additionally the specifications include (weighted)
dummies for each mineral type deposit interacted by year in an AC (Mineral × Year FE). The
mineral type dummies are weighted by the number of deposits for that mineral in an AC. BW
refers to the area bandwidth, used for selecting ACs on either side of the border for the analy-
sis. Post refers to the years after breakup i.e., year 2001 onwards: New States is an indicator for
the newly created state; Mineral refers to the total quality of mines within each AC; Conflict
measures the total number of conflict occurrences, by year, within each AC. Standard errors,
clustered at the AC level, are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10%; ** at
5%; *** at 1%.
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